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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine and evaluate the effectiveness of those
dispute settlement mechanisms that are capable of resolving the Guyana-Venezuela
border dispute. This thesis will analyze those legal principles and/or techniques of the
International Court of Justice, mediation and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which
are indispensable for dispute resolution. I argue that a resolution is significant for the
stability of the international community.
Guyana and Venezuela possess economic and political interests in the disputed
Essequibo region. Venezuela’s predilection for bilateral negotiations contradicts
Guyana’s request for a judicial solution. These extreme positions are not novel but were
shaped by the history of the dispute. A historical analysis of the Guyana-Venezuela
border dispute will highlight those reasons for their extreme positions and reinforce the
degree of complexity which is often associated with dispute resolution.
The border dispute was ‘settled’ by a tribunal in 1899 but it persists. Thus, the
thesis will test whether the dispute is based on colonial inheritance or is solely based on
the economic value associated with the Essequibo region. This analysis will help to
evaluate the applicability of the aforementioned dispute settlement mechanisms.
Additionally, it will predict those legal principles and/or techniques which are pertinent
and necessary for the resolution of the dispute. Ultimately, the thesis will conclude by
critically evaluating and predicting the roles and effectiveness of the International Court
of Justice, mediation and the Permanent Court of Arbitration towards resolving this
dispute. ‘Resolution’ will not be limited to a decision being made. Instead, ‘resolution’
will include the level of compliance and current relationship status of states that had their
dispute settled by the International Court of Justice, mediation or the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. One of the three dispute settlement mechanisms will then be selected as the
best option for resolving the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute. Selection will be based
on the effectiveness and relativity of the dispute settlement mechanism, in accordance
with, the dynamics of the dispute.
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Chapter I
A. INTRODUCTION
In international law, territory constitutes the spatial reference for the exercise of
sovereign powers, and conveys the notion of consistance (consistency).1 This legal
principle, known as ‘territorial sovereignty’ was described by the International Court of
Justice in the Corfu Channel case as an essential foundation of international relations.2
Therefore, territorial sovereignty entails, subject to applicable customary or conventional
rules of international law, that the state alone is entitled to exercise jurisdiction within its
territory.3 Moreover, it safeguards a state against any form of interference by other states.
However, in modern times, this right is often challenged by the responsibility to protect
norm (R2P) and the principle of humanitarian intervention. Thus, the perception that
territorial disputes were a thing of the past is debatable.
The demarcations of territorial borders during the colonial period did facilitate
those efforts by independent states to consolidate their powers. However, the arbitrary
and inconsistent demarcations of these borders have contributed immensely to the
presence of territorial disputes among states. Thus, border and territorial disputes is
classified as a sophisticated and prominent challenge to the doctrine of territorial
sovereignty. This is due to the international community’s acceptance of those various
demarcations of territorial boundaries as ‘legitimate’ despite their colonial origins.

1

Q Nguyen et.al. Droit International Public, 3rd Edition, (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1987),
p. 379.
2
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 6, 35 (Apr. 9) [hereinafter Corfu Channel].
3
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, “Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace,” International Law Studies,
Vol. 89, U.S. (Naval War College, 2013), p. 124.
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A territorial dispute occurs when two or more states formally claim legitimate
jurisdiction over the same piece of territory. 4 Existing literature examines sources of
territorial disputes through the lens of power politics5 or the realist theory. Realism
classifies territorial disputes as an expression of power, since territory is seen as a
fundamental power base.6 Realists identify states as rational actors that seek power.
Power is the core concept that influences a state’s behavior, interactions and capabilities
relative to other states. Here, the acquisition of territory is instrumental for a state’s
security apparatus and pursuit of economic growth. These benefits are achieved from the
lucrative nature of natural resources which have resulted in a number of territorial
disputes over the years.7
On the other hand, normative theory has suggested that subjectively-formed
norms, conceptions of justice, and beliefs can motivate territorial claims and trigger
conflict over disputed territories. 8 Hence, territorial disputes do not originate from
political or economic interests entirely, but also serves as source of sovereignty and
identity both for the states and their citizens.9 These theoretical explanations have
compelled organizations such as the United Nations to intervene in resolving territorial
disputes to preserve global peace. The United Nations’ system contains various dispute

Stephen Kocs. “Territorial Disputes and Interstate War 1945-1987,” The Journal of Politics 57(01) 1995, p. 161.
Tuomas Forsberg, “Explaining Territorial Disputes: From Power Politics to Normative Reasons,” Journal of Peace
Research, (Sage Publications, Ltd, 1996,) p. 433.
6
P Liberman, “Spoils of Conquest,” International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, 1993, p. 125-153.
7
Kay Hober, “Territorial disputes and natural resources: The melting of the ice and Arctic disputes,” Oil and Gas
Journal, 2011. http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-109/issue-6/exploration-development/territorial-disputes-andnatural-resources.html
8
Tuomas Forsberg, “Explaining Territorial Disputes: From Power Politics to Normative Reasons,” Journal of Peace
Research, vol. 33, no. 4, 1996, p. 433-449.
9
D Knight, “Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism,” Annals of the
Association of American Geographers, vol. 72, no. 4, p. 514-531.
4
5
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resolution mechanisms that utilize fact finding missions, mediation, peacekeeping and
other initiatives to resolve disputes equitably and in some cases, juridical solutions.
The Guyana-Venezuela border dispute has attracted international attention once
again. This is due to the significant oil discovery conducted by ExxonMobil in May 2015
at the Stabroek Block, which is approximately 120 miles offshore Guyana. 10 In response
to this discovery, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro had issued an official decree, no.
1787 which initially renewed Venezuela’s de facto claim to the Essequibo region of
Guyana (see Figure 1). The decree was so disproportionate that Colombia, which has
maritime disputes with Venezuela, issued a formal protest. 11 Consequently, decree no.
1787 was withdrawn and decree no. 1859 was issued instead. The Venezuelan
government had issued decree no. 1859 to support and justify the actions of the
Bolivarian National Armed Force (FANB) in defending the newly created Integrated
Defense Maritime Zones and Island (Zodimain). This decree’s sole purpose and exclusive
range of concerns were protection against threats, risks and other vulnerabilities. The
decree did not indicate any ruling on issues concerning territorial or alien by nature. 12
Despite the border dispute, both nations have co-operated on trade, health and
other sectors. For example, the Guyanese government had signed a rice compensation
agreement with Venezuela in 2009 wherein Guyanese rice exports were accepted in
partial payment for imports of Venezuelan oil.13 This agreement ended in November

10

ExxonMobil Announces Significant Oil Discovery Offshore Guyana. May 20, 2015 - 01:13 p.m. EDT.
http://news.exxonmobil.com/press-release/exxonmobil-announces-significant-oil-discovery-offshore-guyana
11
Domínguez Jorge and Rafael Fernández, Contemporary U.S.-Latin American Relations: Cooperation Or Conflict in
the 21st Century? 2nd Edition. (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2016,) p. 229
12
Ishmael, Odeen. Venezuela replaces Decree no. 1787 with no. 1859, Guyana Graphic, 2015.
http://www.guyanagraphic.com/letters-editor/dr-odeen-ishmael/venezuela-replaces-decree-no-1787-no-1859
13
Roger Rogers et.al, “Guyana's PetroCaribe Rice Compensation Scheme Has Ended Assessment and Policy
Implications,” Country Department Caribbean Group, 2016, p.1.
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2015 and has not been renewed. Nevertheless, it qualifies as a territorial dispute because
Venezuela has historically refused to recognize Guyana’s territorial sovereignty over the
Essequibo region. Venezuela continues to claim the Essequibo region as a part of its
territory. The origins of this border dispute can be traced at the end of the 18 th century
during European colonialism of South America.

Figure 1: Map showing Guyana-Venezuela border dispute
Great Britain (for British Guiana) signed a Treaty of Arbitration with the Republic
of Venezuela signed in 1897. Article 1 of the treaty had provided for the immediate
appointment of an arbitral tribunal to determine the boundary line between Guyana
(British Guiana, at the time) and Venezuela. By virtue of arbitration proceedings, Guyana
was awarded the Essequibo region in 1899. Since then, the international community has
recognized Essequibo as a part of Guyana’s territorial sovereignty. However, Venezuela
has repeatedly claimed that the arbitral award of 1899 is null and void. In 2015,
Venezuela had intensified its claim over the Essequibo region after ExxonMobil’s

4
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significant oil discovery.14 After UN-led efforts to resolve the dispute were unproductive,
Secretary-General, António Guterres decided to refer the border dispute to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The ICJ’s jurisdiction is based on the consent of the parties. Here, states possess
the option to either accept or decline the court's jurisdiction under those terms and
conditions they determine themselves. A state that is involved in a border dispute which
has filed declarations that recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ has the right
to institute proceedings against a state that also accepted the ICJ’s compulsory
jurisdiction. This provision is in accordance with Article 36 (2) of the ICJ Statute, (also
known as the optional clause). Thus, if one state has not declared its recognition of the
ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, it can decline a request to take a border dispute to the ICJ.
The UN Secretary-General’s decision to refer the Guyana-Venezuela border
dispute to the ICJ was in accordance with the Geneva Agreement. This agreement was
signed by Great Britain and Venezuela in 1966. Under Article IV (2), the SecretaryGeneral possesses the authority to choose a means of peaceful settlement among those
contemplated in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. 15Article IV (1) of the
Geneva Agreement had empowered the UN Secretary-General to do so once Guyana and

14

David Connett, Guyana and Venezuela in bitter border dispute after oil discovery, The Independent, 2015.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/guyana-and-venezuela-in-bitter-border-dispute-after-oildiscovery-a6668651.html
15
Secretary-General Chooses International Court of Justice as Means for Peacefully Settling Long-Standing GuyanaVenezuela Border Controversy, 30 January, 2018. https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sgsm18879.doc.htm
Article 33 of the Charter states that any dispute that is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security should first be addressed through negotiation, mediation or other peaceful means, and states that the Council
can call on the parties to use such means to settle their dispute.
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Venezuela had failed to reach an agreement to resolve the dispute.16 Despite this
provision, Venezuela cannot be forced ‘in theory’ to be present at ICJ proceedings.
Venezuela’s objection to the Secretary-General’s decision to refer the border
dispute to ICJ had increased the possibility of its non-participation with the ICJ. Thus,
there is a real possibility that the border dispute may never be heard by the ICJ or will
take an extended period of time to be heard. Therefore, other dispute settlement
mechanisms should be considered as alternatives. The best alternatives I have identified
within this thesis are: (1) mediation by a neutral state, Norway in this regard, or (2)
settling the dispute at the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION & THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

The research question is: Given the unwillingness of Guyana and Venezuela to resolve
their border dispute through bilateral negotiations, how successful and effective can
territorial dispute mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice, mediation by a
neutral state or through the good offices of the UN Secretary-General and the Permanent
Court of Arbitration be towards resolving border disputes?
In this thesis, I examine how successful either the ICJ, mediation by a neutral
state or the Permanent Court of Arbitration can be towards resolving the GuyanaVenezuela border dispute. The Secretary-General’s decision to refer the GuyanaVenezuela’s border dispute to the ICJ for juridical settlement acknowledged the
seriousness of the issue but was controversial. Neither nation has filed any declaration
that recognizes the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction. Although Guyana had welcomed the

16

Geneva Agreement, 1966:
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20561/volume-561-i-8192-english.pdf
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decision, Venezuela can refuse to have the border dispute adjudicated by the ICJ. Thus,
its declination can dismiss the ICJ’s role in resolving this dispute. Venezuela did not
provide any official statement on the Secretary-General’s decision. Instead, Venezuela
emphasized its predilection for the resumption of bilateral negotiations. Thus, I consider
the possibility of Venezuela declining the ICJ’s jurisdiction as high and consequently will
discuss other alternatives available to Guyana and Venezuela.
The more hopeful alternative dispute settlement mechanisms identified here are
mediation by a neutral state as one option and the Permanent Court of Arbitration as
another. I consider UN-led efforts as an alternative to be weak at this point. The United
Nations has attempted to play an active role in resolving the dispute, as recent as 2017,
but without success. The breakdown of negotiations between the two states was the main
reason for their unproductivity. This thesis will examine why bilateral negotiations and
UN-led mediation efforts did not make any significant progress.
Adding to this intransigence to settle this dispute is exemplified by Guyana and
Venezuela’s opposing stances on the arbitral award of 1899. While Venezuela argues it is
invalid and void, Guyana, on the contrary, argues it is legal and binding on the two
nations. Consequently, their unwillingness to compromise on proposals such as, Guyana
ceding some of its Essequibo territory to Venezuela or re-demarcating the region’s
borders, had contributed to the Secretary-General’s decision to refer the case to the ICJ.
Moreover, the recent oil discovery by ExxonMobil in the maritime area of the Essequibo
region was identified as a catalyst for Venezuela’s claims. Venezuela’s claims to the
disputed Essequibo region not only challenge Guyana’s territorial sovereignty but can
potentially impede Guyana’s economic potential to attract foreign direct investment.
7
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Mediation can be considered an alternative to resolve the border dispute, if led by
a neutral state. Norway will be selected as a possible neutral state. Norway’s
determination to promote peace and reconciliation has varied in accordance with the
conflict at question and other logistics. Norway has sought to demonstrate its relevance in
the world by practicing what one commentator has called ‘niche diplomacy.’ 17 Thus,
Norway is said to possess a voice and a presence on the international stage out of
proportion to its modest position and assets achieved through a ruthless prioritization of
its target audiences and its concentration on a single message: Norway as a force for
peace.18 Norway’s large foreign-aid budget (second among industrialized countries) and
its conflict resolution efforts in the Middle East, Sri Lanka and Colombia, the rapid
reaction force (the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights) to
assist in election monitoring and conflict prevention in about 20 countries annually, and
the Nobel Peace Prize raise its profile as a peacemaker. 19 Norway’s role and the
possibility of its involvement in resolving the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute will be
critically analyzed.
Unlike the ICJ, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) does not require the
presence or consent of the states involved in the dispute per se. This feature is not
intrinsic to the PCA itself. It is based on the provisions of multilateral or bilateral treaties
signed between states which address arbitration proceedings. The PCA is not a “court"
per se. It is an administrative organization with the object of having permanent and
17

John Stephen Moolakkattu, “Peace Facilitation by Small States Norway in Sri Lanka, Cooperation and Conflict,”
Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association Vol. 40(4): 385–402, 2005, p. 387.
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5705~v~Peace_Facilitation_by_Small_State__Norway_in_Sri_La
nka.pdf
18
John Stephen Moolakkattu, “Peace Facilitation by Small States Norway in Sri Lanka, Cooperation and Conflict,”
Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association Vol. 40(4): 385–402, 2005, p. 387.
19
Mark Leonard, ‘Diplomacy by Other Means’, Foreign Policy (132), (September/October): 48–56, 2002, p.57.
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readily available means to serve as the registry for purposes of international arbitration
and other related procedures, including commissions of enquiry and conciliation. 20 The
PCA’s jurisdiction is often outlined in arbitration agreements or treaties. The tribunal’s
composition is outlined in the Conventions on Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes. PCA decisions are binding and there is no mechanism for appeal. 21 If the PCA
arbitrates on the border dispute between Guyana and Venezuela, its jurisdiction would
derive from the Geneva Agreement. However, Guyana and Venezuela can draft and sign
an arbitration agreement that defines the scope of the PCA’s jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, I will investigate these questions:
1. Is the territorial dispute more to do with the significant oil discovery or colonial
inheritance?
2. Why did the mediation efforts by the United Nations fail to resolve the GuyanaVenezuela border dispute?
3. How can the ICJ, Permanent Court of Arbitration or mediation by Norway: (i)
safeguard Guyana’s territorial sovereignty and (ii) benefit its future economic
development plans given ExxonMobil’s continuous discovery of huge oil reserves in
the disputed region?
4. Of all the territorial dispute mechanisms available, which is most effective towards
resolving the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute?
5. How would a legal decision be enforced?
6. If not enforceable, what advantage does a legal decision provide?
20

Shabtai Rosenne, "The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and International Arbitration: Reports and
Documents", (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2001,) p. xxi.
21
Arthur Eyffinger, The Peace Palace: Residence for Justice, Domicile of Learning. (Carnegie Foundation, 1988), p.
136.
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C. METHODOLOGY
First, a historical analysis of the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute that explains
those events, in chronological order, that led to a border dispute between Guyana and
Venezuela will be presented. Political science and historical literature that evaluates the
dispute’s origins will be used. The UN’s involvement in resolving the dispute will be
provided. This will effectively support the analysis that explains the current unviability of
UN led mediation and bilateral negotiations. Second, literature that explains the roles of
the ICJ, mediation efforts by Norway and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in resolving
border disputes will be examined. The advantages and disadvantages of each
aforementioned dispute settlement approach will help to determine their effectiveness in
resolving disputes peacefully and developing international law.
In analyzing the ICJ as a dispute settlement mechanism, I will examine the legal
principles utilized by the ICJ in various territorial disputes that decided by the court itself.
This will help the research to predict which legal principles are more applicable towards
resolving the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute. Moreover, I will examine whether there
is a hierarchy among the legal principles utilized by the ICJ in border disputes. The
following ICJ cases are selected for judicial analysis:


Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea
Intervening) 1994



Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal)
Mediation will be analyzed based on the techniques, Norway has implemented

towards the reconciliation and resolution of border disputes. I argue that mediation led by
10
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Norway, can assist Guyana and Venezuela to work towards a resolution to the border
dispute, despite the absence of legal underpinnings.
Furthermore, the decisions of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on territorial
disputes help to determine how international law and/or principles of natural justice/
equity are applied when interpreting the provisions of treaties, relative to the dispute
itself. The following dispute is selected for analysis:


The Government of Sudan / The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
(Abyei Arbitration) ICGJ 422 (PCA 2009)
Last, the thesis will investigate the current relationships between states that were

involved in border dispute which was resolved by the ICJ, PCA or mediation. This
analysis will measure the successes and effectiveness of each dispute settlement
mechanism. The research will conclude by analyzing the effects a resolution will have
on: (1) Guyana and Venezuela’s diplomatic relations and (2) the territorial sovereignty
and future economic development prospects Guyana anticipates after ExxonMobil’s oil
discovery.

11
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Chapter II: Literature Review
Borders and boundaries evoke emotion, protect, contain, shape relations, facilitate
trade, promote or deter conflicts, and define jurisdictions. 22 The resolution of border
disputes is necessary because it safeguards the territorial sovereignty of states. It also
provides stability within the international community. The absence of a supranational
authority compels states to co-operate in establishing organizations and treaties that
include dispute settlement mechanisms. The peaceful settlement of disputes is entrenched
in numerous conventions and is a customary law principle. 23
Realists such as Robert Gilpin in the book, War and Change in World Politics
argue that within an anarchic international system, a state’s principal objective embodies
the conquest of territory in order to advance economic, security, and other interests. 24
Thus Goertz and Diehl in their book, Territorial Changes and International Conflict
question whether territorial disputes are due to the issue of claiming territory itself or
from, state behavior that includes some projection of power over a smaller neighboring
state. Goertz et.al in the Puzzle of Peace: The Evolution of Peace in the International
System explains that scholars like Robert Ardrey (1966) argue that humans contain
‘territory imperatives’ which lead them to fight over land in order to control resources
that further their survival and development.25 John Vasquez (1983) believes that control
over territory is significant because it possesses intangible and tangible benefits for a

22

Lucius Calflisch, "Typology of Borders," International Symposium on Land and River Boundary Demarcation and
Maintenance in Support of Borderland Development. (Bangkok, 2006).
https://www.dur.ac. uk/resources/ibru/conferences/thailand/caflisch.pdf
23
ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and against Nicaragua, Merits (Nicaragua v USA), ICJ
Reports (1986) 14, para. 290.
24
Robert Gilpin. War and Change in World Politics. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 23.
25
Goertz, et.al, The Puzzle of Peace: The Evolution of Peace in the International System, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016), p.83.
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sovereign nation.26 Those tangible benefits refer to those elements of territory that
enhance security, survival and wealth while intangible benefits are associated with
culture, pride and justice.27 Of all interstate disputes, Vasquez had suggested that those
over territory tend to be the most salient for states and most likely to lead to armed
conflict. This observation can be associated with the political instability that the Middle
East region continues to grapple with today. The Guyana-Venezuela border dispute has
not yet yielded any significant indicators of an incoming armed conflict. Therefore, one
should not immediately link territorial claims to armed conflicts between states.
There is an indication that territorial disputes are a consequence of a state’s
survival behavior. However, globalization and its insistence on ‘co-operation’ have
shaped state behavior and attitudes. Nye and Keohane’s Power and Interdependence:
World Politics in Transition argue that states are interdependent, i.e. mutual dependence
resulting from the types of international transactions catalogued by transnationalists –
flows of money, goods and services etc.28 Complex interdependence refers to a situation
among a number of countries in which multiple channels of contact connect societies. 29
Complex interdependence has increased exponentially due to globalization, and has
shifted attitudes of territorial conquest towards sustaining diplomatic relations in order to
protect trade. Thus, Goertz and Diehl’s description of a territorial dispute as zero-sum

26

John Vasquez. “The Tangibility of Issues and Global Conflict: A Test of Rosenau's Issue Area Typology,” Journal
of Peace Research, Vol. 20, Issue 2, 1983, p. 181
27
John Vasquez. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 20, Issue 2, 1983, p. 181.
28
Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi. International Relations Theory 5th Edition. (Illinois: Pearson Education Inc., 2012),
p.144.
29
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence revisited, International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4
(Autumn, 1987), p. 731.
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(usually only one entity can control a piece of land) 30 helps to reinforce the economic
importance of resolving territorial disputes.
A significant portion of alliances have contained territorial settlement agreements
which ultimately removed one of the most contentious issues between states, (i.e.
territorial claims) and ushered in an era of peaceful relations. 31 Since 1953, states have
successfully resolved ninety-seven territorial disputes through bilateral negotiations,
third- party mediation, arbitration, or adjudication at the International Court of Justice. 32
Therefore, it would be an argumentum ad populum to automatically claim that
globalization was responsible for this inclination to have dispute settlement mechanisms
available in agreements among states.
Due to increasing interdependence of the global economy, there is a strong
perception that borders should not matter as much. However, territorial disputes have
persevered despite this interdependence. Thus, the idea that territory still matters should
not be overlooked. In Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive
Diplomacy, and Settlement, Krista Wiegand calls this dilemma the ‘endurance of
territorial disputes.’ Wiegand states that this dilemma explains the current status of states’
behavior and their willingness to incur long- term military costs to maintain or prepare
for troop mobilization, armament preparations, and ship or submarine deployments in
waters near the disputed territory.33 Consequently, financial resources are diverted from
other domestic needs such as social welfare, education, infrastructures, economic
30

Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl. Territorial Changes and International Conflict. (New York: Routledge Publishers,
1992,) p. 51
31
Douglas Giber. Alliances that Never Balance: The Territorial Settlement Treaty, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 1996
32
Krista Wiegand, “Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement,” p.
2.
33
Krista Wiegand, p. 2.
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development, or other important issues.34 Thus, Wiegand presents to her readers an
empirical puzzle, asserting that territorial disputes will remain a complex international
threat to global security and even the economic development of states.
Wiegand argues that ambiguous historic treaties signed by colonizers but rejected
by most postcolonial sovereign states remain a major source of territorial disputes.
However, Goertz and Diehl have rationally deduced that some states prefer to stand firm
in territorial disputes. The effects of such action can either maintain or increase a state’s
reputation and territorial expansion may be considered as an outgrowth of domestic and
economic development.35 Wiegand simplifies this analysis by stating that some states
intentionally create a territorial dispute to utilize it as ‘bargaining leverage’ against other
disputed issues.36 Wiegand highlights Saudi Arabia’s deliberate usage of its border
dispute to compel North Yemen to reconsider unification with South Yemen and Yemeni
relations with the Soviets as an example of bargaining leverage. 37 This bargaining
leverage theory illustrates that not all disputes occur due to the saliency of the territory
but due to geopolitical and economic interests of states. Wiegand concludes that the level
of salience a disputed territory possesses greatly influences a state’s reluctance to agree to
territorial concessions. Thus, analysts are forced to consider what are a state’s intention
and the feasibility of mediation as a capable dispute mechanism.

34

Krista Wiegand, “Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement,”
Studies in Security and International Affairs Series (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 2011), p. 279
35
Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl. “Territorial Changes and Militarized Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 32,
Issue 1, 1988, p. 104.
36
Krista Wiegand, “Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement,”
Studies in Security and International Affairs Series (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 2011).
37
Krista Wiegand, “Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement,” p.
43.
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Therefore, the resources or economic value attached to the disputed territory can
be the major source of the dispute, and not necessarily an ambiguous colonial treaty.
Wiegand argues that issue saliency explains reasons for the presence of a border dispute
while the realist approach focuses on the relationships between the states. 38 Studies of
interstate territorial conflict have recognized natural resources as one of the elements that
make many territories ‘salient’ or valuable to the claimant states. 39
Macaulay and Hensel do not address whether claims over territory with a resource
component compels states to pursue dispute settlement mechanisms. However, most
bilateral and multilateral treaties contain dispute settlement clauses that compel states to
seek resolution. There is not much literature that explains the willingness of states to have
their territorial disputes settled by judicial mechanisms. I believe that states fear the
winner/loser situation that the ICJ or arbitration effectively begets. Nonetheless, Wiegand
reckons that the settlement of disputes is beneficial because they often reduce those costs
that are incurred during a dispute. Moreover, settlement lessens the need for higher
military expenditures and contributes to overall positive bilateral relations between states.
Dispute settlement mechanisms can be classified into two groups: diplomaticpolitical and adjudication-legal. This distinction is characterized by the binding nature of
the dispute settlement processes. Thus, the International Court of Justice and Permanent
Court of Arbitration can be categorized as adjudication-legal. These mechanisms apply
international law, equity and/or natural justice to facts; conventions define their
composition, responsibilities and processes that are culminated by a legally binding
38
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decision. On the other hand, mediation can be classified as diplomatic-political. Its
purpose is to reconcile strained relations between states and encourage co-operation.
States can then create a peace agreement, binding them to its terms and conditions.
The International Court of Justice’s contribution to resolving territorial disputes
within the international community is well documented. In Politics and the Emergence of
an Activist International Court of Justice, Thomas Bodie argues that the ICJ continues to
respond adequately to the political realities of adjudicating disputes while restricting any
attempts at judicial activism. He concludes that the court has been cautious not to embroil
itself in political issues while simultaneously not shying away from cases with political
overtones.40 This approach has led to suitable decisions on even the most political
disputes. Furthermore, Bodie contends that the ICJ’s relevance is exhibited through its
jurisprudence which has successfully addressed a wide range of sovereignty-related
issues. Bodie’s view offers a fresh perspective on the ICJ’s relevance and contribution to
international law. However, Bodie leaves us to ponder whether the pluralistic nature of
the international community will compel the ICJ to expand its established jurisprudence
to consider political factors when making a decision.
In Sumner’s article, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, the
author argues that there is a hierarchical structure in territorial claims which were decided
by the ICJ. Sumner states that territorial disputes adjudicated by the ICJ are generally
divided into nine categories: treaties, geography, economy, culture, effective control,
history, uti possidetis, elitism, and ideology.41 Sumner asserts that there is a tripartite

40

Thomas Bodie, Politics and the Emergence of an Activist International Court of Justice. (California: Praeger, 1995),
p. 89.
41
Brian Sumner, “Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice,” Duke Law Journal Vol. 53, 2004, p. 1781.

17

Guyana-Venezuela Border Dispute: Seeking a Peaceful Solution

hierarchy among treaties, uti possidetis and effective control. Effective control has the
outcome of giving a broad scope to treaty law and possibly imputing more meaning to the
principle of uti possidetis than it merits at this stage in the evolution of public
international law.42 In justifying his observation, Sumner evaluates various territorial
disputes held before the ICJ and had offered three explanations for the presence of this
hierarchy. Sumner explains that ICJ decisions are based on international treaties. Sumner
claims that this rationale is pursued because it restores predictability and stability to the
international system. Hence, Sumner argues that this behavior raises suspicions of the ICJ
being bias towards treaties and other legal justifications.
Sumner’s article clearly challenges the relativity of Bodie’s perspective on the
ICJ’s strict adherence to its jurisprudence in today’s pluralistic society. In support of
Sumner’s analysis, Posner and Figueiredo present a quantitative study that seems to
provide some evidence that ICJ judges vote for their home states about 90% of the time.
When their home states are not involved, judges vote for states that are similar to their
home states—along the dimensions of wealth, culture, and political regime. 43 However,
Posner and Figueiredo’s data expresses mere suspicions of bias rather than actual
certainty in their results. Consequently, there is doubt in the evidence presented in their
research. The two conflicting perspectives can introduce a comprehensive study on
whether the ICJ should maintain its strict adherence to law or also consider political
factors in its decision making process. Will consideration of political factors undermine
the ICJ’s judicial heritage and relevance? This question will ultimately confront the ICJ
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c0d2/8f2e24a9ac497b512d67c7a48f8434fea87e.pdf
42
Brian Sumner, “Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice,” Duke Law Journal Vol. 53, 2004, p. 1812.
43
Eric Posner and Miguel Figueirido, Is the International Court of Justice Biased? (John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 234, 2004), p. 28.

18

Guyana-Venezuela Border Dispute: Seeking a Peaceful Solution

in future cases on territorial disputes. It offers a great platform on how the GuyanaVenezuela border dispute is viewed by both states and whether the ICJ may consider
those political factors inherent to the dispute.
Kleiboer describes mediation as a form of conflict management in which a third
party assists two or more contending parties to find a solution without resorting to
force.44 Kleiboer’s article, Understanding the Success and Failure of International
Mediation presents wide-ranging answers on those factors that explain mediation
outcomes and when is it appropriate to label mediation a success. Kleiboer emphasizes
that there are no definitive criteria for assessing mediation’s success. However, success
can be determined via two criteria: (1) in a situation where both parties formally or
informally accept a mediator and a mediative attempt is done within five days and (2) the
mediation actually produces an outcome, i.e. a ceasefire, a partial or full settlement.45
The main disadvantage of the first criterion is that it completely eliminates mediation in
disputes where the relationships between the states are strained. Moreover, the first
criterion disregards the mediation outcome which the second criterion emphasizes on.
Nonetheless, Kleiboer lists three factors of disputes that impact mediation
outcomes. They are: (1) conflict ripeness, (b) the level of conflict intensity and (c) the
nature of the issues(s) of the conflict. These three factors are not mutually exclusive and
are reinforced by Wiegand’s hypothetical analysis of mediation and disputes in the
article, Mediation in Territorial, Maritime and River Disputes. Wiegand tests whether the
aforementioned factors encourage the type of mediation strategy to pursue, (i.e.
44
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procedural, directive or communications), how and why. Her hypothesis i.e. the higher
the levels of tangible saliency of disputed territory, the less likely states are pursue
mediation as a disputed resolution strategy achieved mixed results.
Wiegand explains that the timing of mediation is critical to the type of strategy
that will be utilized for a territorial dispute. E.g. Wiegand states that it would be logical
for a neutral state to use the directive strategy in a territorial dispute where armed conflict
is ongoing or was recent. Previous research illustrated that if the disputed territory has
tangible salience to the disputants and is divisible, a successful conflict resolution,
through mediation or other methods is likely. 46 Wiegand challenges this previous
research. She argues that mediation’s success is not as effective as bilateral negotiations
because divisible territory that has tangible value encourages compromise and
concessions by the disputants, making mediation less necessary. Weigand’s article on
mediation will be tested when critically analyzing the efficacy of mediation by Norway in
the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute.
Last, Copeland’s article, the Use of Arbitration To Settle Territorial Disputes
focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of arbitration and also critically discusses
international disputes that have been arbitrated. Copeland accepts that the inclusion in
peace treaties of such dispute resolution mechanisms as arbitral clauses may be one way
to peacefully solve territorial disputes. However, Copeland’s notes that states are
reluctant to pursue arbitration for the settlement of disputes because a judicial outcome
creates a zero-sum (winner/loser) situation. Copeland’s critique seems to rely heavily on
issue saliency and the impact it has on states’ behavior towards dispute settlement
46
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mechanisms. Although Copeland’s assessment is well acknowledged, there is limited
literature that evaluates the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s contributions towards
peaceful solutions of disputes. Instead, much of the literature focuses on the features of
the court itself and its comparative advantages over the ICJ.
Nonetheless, the literatures discussed in the aforementioned paragraphs do
provide a comprehensive evaluation of territorial disputes. Theoretical frameworks help
to explain those factors that are accountable for the persistence of territorial disputes
despite the phenomenon of interdependence among states. The literature provides several
perspectives on how the effectiveness of dispute settlement mechanisms in territorial
disputes is measured. It presents a compelling case for one to select which mechanism is
more appropriate based on the current status and factors attributable to a particular border
dispute. Thus, a review of the literature provides the advantages and disadvantages on the
three dispute settlement mechanisms relative to the resolution of the Guyana-Venezuela
border dispute. It is evident that literature on the success rates of the ICJ and POA is
insufficient. Success rate is not limited to whether a decision is made. It includes whether
or not the ICJ, PCA or mediation by Norway had improved diplomatic relations between
the states embroiled in the territory dispute.
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Chapter III: Background of Border Dispute
A. COLONIAL PERIOD (1840-1949)
1. Early History of the Dispute
In November 1840, Robert Hermann Schomburgk was appointed by the British
government to survey the boundaries of its colony, British Guiana provisionally. 47
Schomburgk carried out a comprehensive topographical survey and proposed a boundary
line with Venezuela (see Figure 2). Schomburgk did not discover or invent any new
boundaries. His reports derived from actual exploration and information that provided
evidence of Dutch occupation and trade with the Amerindians at Barima and on the
Cuyuni Rivers.48 Schomburgk had relied on this evidence to ascertain the limits of Dutch
occupation and the zone where all trace of Spanish influence was absent. 49

Figure 2: Map published by Venezuela in 1841 showing the Schomburgk
Line and Essequibo Region
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Venezuela rejected the boundary line proposal. Venezuela argued that
Schomburgk’s survey had included territory to the west of the Essequibo River, which it
declared as part of its jurisdiction.50 Consequently, diplomatic discussions on the
boundary arose between the governments of Great Britain and Venezuela. Thus, the
Venezuelan government proposed the negotiation of a Treaty of Limits which would
precede the survey and demarcation of the frontier by Schomburgk. Venezuela had
insisted that the ‘Schomburgk Line’ was invalid. Venezuela argued that the Essequibo
region was the natural boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana and the British
colonists possessed little or nothing beyond that river. 51 Venezuela’s repeated proposals
to arbitrate the Essequibo boundary were largely ignored by Great Britain.
2. United States Intervention
Venezuela suspended diplomatic relations with Britain in 1887 and appealed to
the United States for help. Venezuela proposed arbitration of the border dispute in 1877
but the United States had initially rebuffed any involvement. Britain’s Lord Salisbury
refused Venezuela's requests for arbitration, and brushed aside the offers of mediation by
the United States.52 The United States was at that time primarily concerned with the
development of the trans-continental canal, and the extension of the Monroe Doctrine in
Latin America.53 The USA believed that Great Britain’s refusal to arbitrate had indicated
its commitment to continue its aggressive policies in Latin America. 54 President
Cleveland had encouraged the United States Congress to pass a resolution urging Britain
50
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and Venezuela to arbitrate the dispute. The resolution passed both Houses of the U.S.
Congress by a unanimous vote and was signed it into law on February 20, 1895. 55 This
resolution granted the U.S. Congress the power to nominate the members of a boundary
commission. For the USA, arbitration between Venezuela and British Guiana served as a
pre-textual way to assert its dominance over the Caribbean and Latin America, and to
help establish the United States as an international power. 56
3. 1899 Arbitral Award
In 1897, Great Britain signed a Treaty of Arbitration (also known as the Treaty of
Washington) with Venezuela which established a tribunal. By virtue of Article XIII of the
aforementioned treaty, the contracting parties would recognize the arbitral award as the
full, perfect and final settlement.57 This meant that the tribunal’s decision would be
legally binding on Great Britain (British Guiana) and Venezuela. The treaty had also
defined its core concepts of law, (i.e. principle of occupation), the tribunal’s rules and
composition. Article II of the treaty authorized Great Britain and Venezuela to nominate
two (2) jurists each, and the four jurists would choose the President of the tribunal. 58
After this treaty was signed, the US boundary commission was officially
dissolved. Its report which included historical analysis on Dutch colonization in
Essequibo and the geography of the region was subsequently made available to
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Venezuela to prepare for its case before the tribunal.59 Arbitration commenced in 1899 in
Paris, France.


Venezuela’s Case before the Tribunal

The Venezuelan case before the tribunal focused primarily on the claim that after
Great Britain acquired British Guiana in 1814, its colony’s boundary was the Essequibo
River. Venezuela claimed that the frontier shown on various maps printed in London and
Venezuela had shown the Essequibo line as the original Schomburgk Line of 1835. 60
Venezuela argued that this evidence was identifiable on maps drawn by Schomburgk,
before he showed partiality for British interests.61


Great Britain’s Case before the Tribunal

The British argued that they inherited the Dutch occupied areas, which were the
Essequibo, Mazaruni, Cuyuni, Moruka, Pomeroon, Waini, Barima and Amakura Rivers. 62
Britain’s case relied heavily on Dutch occupation and trade with the Amerindians on the
coast of Guiana between the Orinoco and Amazon Rivers. 63 Britain’s claim would have
extended to the west of the Essequibo River and west of Point Barima where neither
Spain nor Venezuela had ever exercised jurisdiction. Great Britain’s claim relied
exclusively on the principle of effective occupation in international law.
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Decision of the Arbitral Tribunal

On October 4, 1899, the arbitration panel had presented a unanimous award to a
border dispute that lasted over 45 years – a controversy which could have caused
Venezuela, the United States and Great Britain to go to war. 64 The boundary line chosen
by the tribunal started from Point Playa, forty-five miles east of Point Rivers and
extended south along the Amacura River (See Figure 3). Consequently, Great Britain was
granted nearly ninety percent of the Essequibo region. In total, Great Britain received
45,000 of the 53,000 square miles disputed. 65 However, Great Britain had lost control of
the mouths of the Amakura and the Barima Rivers and territory in the upper Cuyuni
Basin. The award coincided greatly with much of the Schomburgk Line of 1840. On the
other hand, Venezuela was awarded only the mouth of the Orinoco River and a 5,000
square mile extension around Point Barima.66
Map on the right is an
estimate of the demarcations
in the arbitral award
Key
Red line: Venezuela’s
border
Black line: Arbitral award
which demarcated British
Guiana’s and Venezuela’s
border
Yellow line: Officially
claimed by Great Britain but
was awarded to Venezuela

Figure 3: Map Showing the Boundary awarded by the Arbitration Tribunal
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The arbitral award was criticized by Venezuela. Venezuela argued that the
boundary line’s description was ambiguous. Moreover, Venezuela stated that the award
did not clarify the constructive occupation realities which supposedly were the spirit of
the award and the 1897 Treaty of Arbitration. 67 Although, Venezuelan politicians and its
press had expressed discontent with the arbitral award, its government had reassured
British representatives that the boundary was a chose jugée – a matter which has already
been decided legally and is therefore not worth discussing. 68 Thus, both states accepted
the tribunal’s decision as final.
In keeping with the tribunal’s decision, Britain and Venezuela established a
boundary commission. Their commissioners were sent to carry out a survey and
demarcate the boundary, between 1901 and 1905.69 On January 7, 1905, the resulting
boundary line was drawn on a map and was signed by British Guianese and Venezuelan
representatives (See Figure 4). The agreement was published as a sessional paper of the
Combined Court of Policy of British Guiana.70
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Figure 4: Map showing the division of the Ankoko Island at the junction of the
Cuyuni and Wenamu rivers.
4. Mallet Prevost’s Allegations
It was widely acknowledged that Venezuela’s acceptance of the arbitral award of
1899 had permanently resolved the border dispute with British Guiana. Even as late as
1941, the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Esteban Gil Borges, agreed that the
frontier with British Guiana was well defined and a closed issue. 71 However, the
posthumous publication of a memorandum in 1949 by Mallet Prevost, one of the
American jurists on the boundary commission established by the USA in 1896 had
indicated that the tribunal’s decision was the result of a political deal between Great
Britain and Russia.
Prevost claimed that the American jurists of the tribunal (nominated by
Venezuela) had favored granting Venezuela much more territory but resented the
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‘pressure’ brought upon them to avoid such an award. 72 Prevost stated that the President
of the Tribunal and the jurists nominated by Great Britain feared that the economic
development of South America would be hindered if an adverse decision was handed to
Great Britain.73
American historian, Clifton Child had examined verbatim records of the tribunal
and dispatches passing among London, St. Petersburg and New York during that period.
He concluded that there was “not a single document, which, by the widest stretch of the
imagination, could be considered to indicate a deal between Great Britain and Russia of
the sort suspected by Mr. Mallet Prevost.” 74 However, on the contrary, American
historian, William Cullen Dennis supported Prevost’s memo. Most interestingly, Dennis
did agree that the 1899 award was valid but he emphasized that methods of ‘political
compromise’ used, should be prohibited from future arbitral procedure. 75 Nonetheless,
Prevost’s memo became the impetus for Venezuela to reassert its claim against the
Essequibo region. Various Venezuelan governments were adamant that Prevost’s memo
should invalidate the 1899 arbitral award under international law.


Venezuela’s Motives

The publication of the Prevost memo had coincided with Venezuela’s exploration
of mineral resources such as iron, petroleum and manganese in its Guayana region (see
Figure 5)76 immediately to the west of Guyana’s border.77 American companies and
72
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capital were utilized to carry out these works. As huge deposits of petroleum were being
discovered, right wing politics was gaining momentum. These politicians introduced the
Prevost memo to motivate the Venezuelan people to demand ‘reclamation’ of the
Western Essequibo region.78

Figure 5: Map of Venezuela showing the Guayana region (to its right is the
Essequibo Region of Guyana which Venezuela is claiming)

Amazon river. It is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the east, the Orinoco river to the north and west, the Negro river
to the southwest, and the Amazon river to the south
77
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B. INDEPENDENCE PERIOD (1966 – 2013)
1. Guyana’s Independence
As British Guiana pushed for independence, Venezuela’s desire to expand its
territory increased exponentially. Venezuela did support British Guiana’s independence.
However, it opposed the western Essequibo region being a part of Guyana’s territory.
Thus, in 1962, the Venezuelan government had issued a memorandum to the UN
Secretary-General, U Thant (1961-1971), which officially raised their contention against
the validity of 1899 arbitral award. Additionally, it had reinforced their claim of
ownership of the western Essequibo region.79 As independence drew closer,
representatives from Britain, British Guiana, and Venezuela signed an agreement in
Geneva on February 17, 1966 much to British Guiana’s dismay. 80
2. The Geneva Agreement
Article 1 of the Geneva Agreement established a Mixed Commission. This
Commission consisted of two Guyanese and two Venezuelans. Their purpose was to
determine an amicable solution to the border dispute. Under Article IV of the Geneva
Agreement, the Mixed Commission would last for 4 years and if no solution was found,
both nations would select one of the peaceful settlements provided in Article 33 of the
UN Charter. If both nations failed to select a mechanism for peaceful settlement, Article
IV (2) empowered the Secretary-General to select a dispute settlement mechanism until
the dispute was resolved. The commission’s work stagnated and was unable to achieve
any substantial progress. Guyana alleged that Venezuela was covertly interfering in its
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internal affairs by disseminating propaganda to undermine the loyalty of its Amerindian
population located in the Essequibo region. 81
3. Venezuelan Aggression against Guyana’s half of Ankoko Island
Another reason for the Commission’s failures occurred on October 12, 1966. The
Guyanese military discovered that Venezuelan military and civilian personnel had
occupied the Guyanese half of the Ankoko Island in the Cuyuni River (See Figure 6). The
Guyanese government stressed that Venezuela’s actions violated the Geneva Agreement
and complicated the Mixed Commission’s work. Furthermore, the Guyanese government
argued that Venezuela’s illegal encroachment on its territory represented an
unwillingness to be deterred either by international law or by the specific terms of
bilateral and multilateral agreements it had solemnly concluded. 82 Guyanese Prime
Minister Burnham protested the occupation and demanded Venezuela's complete
withdrawal and removal of its military garrison. 83

Figure 6: Map Showing the Ankoko Island and the Cuyuni River
region where Venezuelan military occupies illegally
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Venezuela refused to comply with Mr. Burnham’s request. Instead, Venezuela
reckoned that Ankoko Island was always a part of their territory. In actuality, this was
fallacious. The border commission, which was formed after the 1899 arbitral award had
judicially and administratively, recognized the Ankoko Island as a part of Guyana’s
territory.84 Moreover, the Venezuelan government had never before challenged the
validity or accuracy of the map produced by the commission.85 At no time did Venezuela
assert its sovereignty over the entire Ankoko Island. With Guyana unable to force a
Venezuelan withdrawal due to its economic, political and military inferiority, Ankoko
Island remains occupied illegally by Venezuela.
4. Protocol of Port-of-Spain (1970-1981)
With no substantial progress clearly visible, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and
Tobago, Eric Williams decided to intervene as a mediator. Guyana and Venezuela’s
diplomatic relations were non-existent but they both agreed to improve their relationship.
On June 18, 1970, the governments of Venezuela, Britain, and Guyana signed an
agreement to place a twelve year moratorium on the border dispute.86 This agreement was
called the Port-of-Spain Protocol. The Port-of-Spain Protocol provided for continued
discussions, a suspension of territorial claims, and automatic renewal of the protocol if it
remained uncontested after the twelve years.87
The Guyanese opposition party, the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) opposed the
agreement. The PPP argued that it undermined the purpose of the Geneva agreement, i.e.
84
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resolving the dispute. Moreover, it permitted Venezuela to continue its illegal occupation
of the Guyanese part of the Ankoko Island. 88 This was true. Venezuela continued to claim
all lands west of the Essequibo Region after 1970. Various maps of Venezuela had
shaded the Essequibo region and labeled it the ‘Zona en Reclamación’ – Zone of
Reclamation (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Map of Guyana produced by Venezuela showing the Zona en
Reclamación
In 1981, Venezuela announced that it would not renew the protocol. Its decision
to end the protocol hinged on numerous events. First, Venezuela had alleged that
Guyanese soldiers had fired shots on two occasions at Venezuelan army personnel; at the
Guyanese border post near to Ankoko Island.89 Guyana fervently denied these
allegations. Second, Guyana’s declining economy in 1982 had presented Venezuela with
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an opportunity to press for a settlement of the border dispute. 90 Last, Guyana had
proposed a massive hydroelectric project on the upper Mazaruni (north-western region of
Essequibo) to the World Bank, which was later approved. To Venezuela, this project
would mark the beginning of Essequibo’s development without its participation. 91
Venezuela’s request to the World Bank to refrain from financing a hydroelectric project
in the Essequibo region had convinced Guyana to acquiesce to Venezuela’s decision to
end the protocol.92 Venezuela’s action was labeled as ‘economic aggression’ by Guyana.
The Guyanese Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham addressed the border issue in a
speech which marked the 12th anniversary of Guyana’s republic status. Burnham said,
“Now that Venezuela has refused to permit automatic renewal of the Protocol, Guyana
stands ready as provided by Article IV of the Geneva Agreement to have recourse to any
one of the means of settlement provided under Article 33 of the Charter of the United
Nations. These include negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement - obviously by the International Court of Justice, resort to regional agencies or
organisations, or other means of settlement mutually agreed by the two parties.” 93

C. United Nations Intervention (1990-2013)
Venezuela favored bilateral negotiations with Guyana to settle the border dispute.
On the other hand, while Guyana expressed optimism initially, it later favored a judicial
settlement by the International Court of Justice as a means of settlement. Venezuela
rejected this proposal but did not provide any explanation. Diplomatic relations between
90
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the two nations had improved, especially in trade, public health and education. However,
both nations were unwilling to compromise on border resolution. 94 Thus, the United
Nations decided to intervene.
1. First Good Offices Process
UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar (1982-991) appointed Dr. Alister
McIntyre in 1990 to act as ‘envoy’ to help resolve the border dispute. 95 Both nations had
accepted Dr. McIntyre’s appointment. Under the good offices process, representatives
from Guyana and Venezuela met with Dr. McIntyre occasionally to examine practical
ideas that could contribute to a peaceful settlement of the border controversy. 96
Diplomatic relations improved drastically in the 1990s between Guyana and Venezuela.
For example, Venezuela had sponsored Guyana’s bid to join the Organization of
American States in the 1990s.
However, the good offices process did not achieve any substantial results on
resolving the dispute. The process failed due to Guyana’s rejection of Venezuela’s
‘globality’ approach. This approach advocated moving the border dispute from a
multilateral framework to bilateral. Guyana believed that this “globality” approach was
disadvantageous to its national security interests. Guyana believed that Venezuela’s
intentions were to eliminate the joint commission and undermine the legitimacy of the
UN good offices process.97
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2. Second Good Offices Process
In 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1997-2006) appointed another good
officer, Mr. Olive Jackman.98 Mr. Jackman discovered that Guyana was unrelenting
towards Venezuela’s proposal to cede part of its territory. To Guyana, any proposal of
ceding part of its territory would be in conflict with the 1899 arbitral award. Guyana was
adamant that a ‘practical settlement’ of the border dispute (in accordance with the
Geneva Agreement) meant: (1) recognition of the validity of the 1899 arbitral award and
(2) not ceding territory or revising its existing frontiers. 99 Jackman reported that
Venezuela’s willingness to negotiate with Guyana on delimiting the maritime boundary
would ultimately present Guyana with a fait accompli.
This dilemma was caused by a treaty signed between Venezuela and Trinidad &
Tobago in 1990. The treaty had regarded a significant portion of Guyana’s exclusive
economic zone as Venezuela’s. Outraged by this, the Guyanese government responded
by sending both nations protest notes urging them to review their geographical coordinates of their maritime area. Guyana’s plea was supported by many Commonwealth
nations and the situation began to diffuse due to the political unrest that occurred in
Venezuela in 2002.100 Thus, progress stagnated because Mr. Jackman was unable to meet
regularly with the representatives to facilitate dialogues and proposals on resolving the
border dispute. Jackman died on January 24, 2007, but this setback did not deter Guyana
and Venezuela from signing the PetroCaribe bilateral agreement, 101 which provided
98
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economic benefits for Guyana alone. On the other hand, Venezuela was able to burnish
its image as a donor as they gained the support of its PetroCaribe partners for its various
diplomatic positions in international fora.102 However, discussions on the border issue
were mute until both nations agreed yet again for another good offices process.
3. Third Good Offices Process
On April 20, 2010, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon (2007-2016) appointed
Dr. Norman Girvan as good officer. Unfortunately, Girvan was unable to produce any
substantial progress on reaching an amicable solution to the border dispute, due to his
death in 2013.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, the UN Good Offices process attempted to bridge a gap between
the two nations. The process intended to facilitate dialogue between Guyana and
Venezuela to settle the dispute amicably. However, no any substantial progress on
resolving the border dispute was achieved because both nations had adopted ‘extreme’
positions adopted by both nations. Neither nation was willing to compromise on their
respective demands. Guyana preferred a judicial solution on the border dispute. Once
Venezuela rejected this proposal, all Guyanese governments continued to assert that the
1899 arbitral award had settled the dispute. On the other hand, Venezuela maintained that
the allegations which emanated from Prevost’s memorandum had invalidated the award.
Due to these extreme positions adopted, the good offices process was unable to introduce
any viable compromises that both nations were willing to accept.
set the premium price over world price at which it would value the rice shipment, and then subtract this amount from
the amount due for its oil shipments to Guyana. The rice-oil compensation has generated benefits for both sides
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Chapter IV: Nature of the Dispute Today (2011-Present)
1. Guyana’s Application for an Extension of its Continental Shelf
Guyana and Venezuela’s relationship had progressed substantially since they both
enjoyed a period of sustained growth and co-operation. They continued to co-operate in
economics, natural disasters prevention and reaction, health and education. However, this
relationship would be tested again. On September 6, 2011, Guyana had submitted an
application before the United Nations’ Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS, to extend its continental shelf by an
extra 150 nautical miles (170 m) from its current 200 nautical miles (exclusive economic
zone), (See Figure 8).103

Figure 8: Map showing Guyana’s application to extend its continental shelf
(black line is the current and red line is the proposed increased)
Generally, the UNCLOS Commission declines a state’s request of continental
shelf extension once that state is embroiled in territorial disputes. Guyana’s application
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had omitted Venezuela’s claim to the Essequibo region by stating, "there are no disputes
in the region relevant to this submission of data and information relating to the outer
limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.”104 Venezuela responded to
Guyana’s application by submitting an objection to the UNCLOS Commission.
In its objection, Venezuela stated that Guyana did not consult them and its
application for an extension of its continental shelf had included the disputed territory,
west of the Essequibo River which, in accordance with the Geneva Agreement of 1966,
was still disputed.105 Although Venezuela is not a member of UNCLOS, it had a
legitimate expectation that Guyana’s application would be rejected under Annex 1 of the
Rules of Procedure of the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. 106 If
Venezuela was a member of UNCLOS, it could have settled this situation through
arbitration or any other dispute mechanism as provided by Article 287 of UNCLOS.
Presently, the status of Guyana’s application remains unclear.
2. Venezuelan Aggression
Despite Venezuela’s objection to Guyana’s exercise of its territorial sovereignty
over the Essequibo Region and its maritime borders, both nations have maintained a good
relationship. In 2012, Guyana issued an exploration license to American company,
Andarko Petroleum Corporation. The Venezuela navy was alarmed about the oil
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concession granted by Guyana near the Venezuelan Atlantic front of Orinoco Delta. 107
Guyana ignored all of Venezuela’s concerns. Thus, the Venezuelan army believed that
their concerns were substantial and consequently, action was taken.
On October 10, 2013, an armed Venezuelan navy vessel entered Guyana’s
territorial waters and forced a seismic vessel, the MV Teknik Perdana, into Venezuelan
waters. The ship and its 36 crew members were detained by the Venezuelan military. 108
The Guyanese government stated that Venezuela’s actions were aggressive and a direct
threat to international peace. The Guyanese government added that Venezuela had failed
to act in accordance with its obligations under Article 33 of the UN Charter. On October
14, 2013, the ship and all 36 crew members were released but the captain of the ship was
charged with violating Venezuela’s economic exclusive zone. 109
3. Exxon Mobil Oil Discovery
In May 2015, Exxon Mobil had announced a significant discovery of high quality
hydrocarbon reserves, including crude oil, in an offshore concession 190 kilometers (120
miles) off the coast of Guyana called the Stabroek Block. It is an area offshore of the
Essequibo territory with a size of 26,800 km (See Figure 9). 110 As Exxon continued to
announce more discoveries, Venezuela questioned the legality of the oil exploration.
Venezuela argued that the oil discoveries were mostly located in the disputed territory’s
maritime areas and Exxon’s actions amounted to a gross violation of international law.
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Political unrest continued to grip Venezuela in 2015. Thus, bilateral negotiations were
seldom but Venezuela maintained its opposition. On September 22, 2015, Venezuela’s
army deployed over 200 troops with missiles, machine guns and a military boat on
Guyana’s frontier between San Martin and Ankoko Island. Although, the troops later
retreated, Guyanese President, David Granger began to intensify efforts to pursue a
juridical settlement to the border dispute.

Figure 9: Map showing Stabroek Block
4. End of the PetroCaribe Agreement
Venezuela’s decision to end the PetroCaribe Agreement in November 2015 was
met with disappointment from Guyana. The compensation agreement was viewed by
observers as under constant threat of modification or cancellation for some time, given
the internal economic and political challenges Venezuela had begun to encounter. 111 The
drastic drop in oil prices from 2014 to the present had caused Venezuela’s oil revenues to
plummet and some observers argued that this economic shock was the main reason
behind Venezuela’s decision. On the other hand, the Guyanese press had expressed
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suggestions that Venezuela’s decision to end the agreement was a form of retaliation
against Guyana.112
5. UN Intervention
Guyana had expressed its disappointment in the work of the UN’s good offices.
Guyana was concerned that the good offices had exhausted its mandate and a juridical
settlement was the final mechanism available. UN Secretary-General António Guterres
had appointed Mr. Dag Halvor Nylander of Norway, as his Personal Representative on
the Border Controversy between Guyana and Venezuela in February 2017. 113 Mr.
Nylander’s appointment was recommended after he helped to arrange a final peace
agreement between the Farc left-wing rebels and the Colombian government. 114 Similar
to the previous good offices processes, the Secretary-General had expressed his
confidence in this initiative. Once again, there was no significant process in negotiations.
Nylander had reportedly attempted several times to convince Guyana to cede both
valuable land and marine space to Venezuela to settle the case.115 However, Guyana’s
“not a blade of grass” political campaign became popular among the public and these
suggestions were rejected immediately by its government.
Therefore, UN Secretary-General, António Guterres decided, in accordance with
Article IV (2) of the Geneva Agreement of 1966, to refer the dispute to International
Court of Justice. Guyana welcomed the Secretary-General’s decision while Venezuela
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criticized it. Venezuela voiced its support in pursuing bilateral negotiations with Guyana.
However, historical antecedents reveal that bilateral negotiations had achieved no
significant progress in resolving the dispute.
6. CARICOM’s continuous support of safeguarding Guyana’s territorial integrity
Since its establishment, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 116 has supported
Guyana’s territorial sovereignty over the Essequibo Region. In its 38th meeting of the
Heads of Government, its members had reiterated their unequivocal support towards the
maintenance and preservation of Guyana’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
CARICOM has not intervened or suggested any forms of dispute resolution. Instead, its
activism in the dispute is limited to public statements that support Guyana.
7. Current Status
Exxon has continued to announce significant oil discoveries which Guyana
foresees as vital to its economic growth. On the other hand, Venezuela continues to battle
with high inflation rates which have triggered civil unrests and a call for elections.
Although, the possibility of military confrontation is low, Guyanese president, David
Granger

had

commenced

preparations

to

review

a

formal

agreement

for military cooperation with Brazil. This action was taken after Venezuelan president,
Nicolás Maduro announced that presidential elections would be held on May 20, 2018. 117
Maduro’s motive is not clear. I reckon that the elections’ results can intensify the current
civil unrest. Maduro’s potential re-election coupled with his low approval ratings can
116
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deepen anti-Maduro rhetoric among the population. Widespread violence in Venezuela
can become a national security threat to Guyana’s safety and investment opportunities.
Thus, the Guyanese President had established two army bases on its jungle frontier with
Venezuela, in an attempt to thwart incursion and invasion. 118 Moreover, this action was
adopted to protect its borders from potential refugee flows.
Guyanese Foreign Minister Carl Greenidge has persistently stated that the
stalemate will continue as the position of Guyana remains the same; “the arbitral award
of 1899 had demarcated their boundaries and it was as full, final and a legal settlement of
the issue.”119 On the other hand, Venezuela continues to insist that the award was null
and void due to the revelation made in Prevost’s memo. On 4 April, 2018, Guyana filed
its application to the International Court of Justice against Venezuela. 120

Figure 10: Map showing the current borders of Guyana and the disputed territory
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Chapter V: Conclusion
In this concluding chapter, I outline three options for finding a peaceful solution
to the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute. In the previous chapters, I have carefully
described the positions of Guyana and Venezuela on the border dispute. Guyana’s
position is based on the legality of the 1899 arbitral award. Guyana classifies Venezuela’s
claim to the Essequibo region as an unnecessary political agenda that is designed to
inhibit economic development within its mineral rich region. On the other hand,
Venezuela argues that the allegations of political bias revealed in Prevost’s memorandum
resulted in the 1899 arbitral award becoming null and void. According to Prevost, the
decision not to award Venezuela more territory within the Essequibo region was due to
the West’s fear that Venezuela would develop the region and inevitably become an
economic superpower.
A. Summary of Border dispute: Colonial inheritance or Essequibo’s economic
value?
If we are to sufficiently evaluate the possible effectiveness of the dispute
settlement mechanisms available for resolving this dispute, it is important to analyze
whether the dispute is more to do with the colonial inheritance or economic value
associated with the Essequibo region. To suggest that the Guyana-Venezuela border
dispute is based on colonial inheritance, the normative theory is more pertinent.
Normative theory suggests that subjectively-formed norms, conceptions of justice, and
beliefs can motivate territorial claims and trigger conflict over disputed territories. 121
Here, Venezuela’s contention that the arbitral award is invalid is grounded on social
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justice. The social justice narrative argues that Venezuela inherited the Essequibo region
which was initially occupied by Spain, which later lost its autonomy over the region. The
Schomburgk Line had shifted the original western Essequibo border and caused
Venezuela to lose territory. Wiegand explains that ambiguous historic treaties signed by
colonizers are a major source of territorial disputes. However, the relevant events that
followed the 1899 arbitral award challenges this assumption. After the award was given,
Venezuela had collaborated with Guyana (British Guiana – at the time) on a boundary
commission to demarcate the western border of the Essequibo region. The boundary
commission established the Essequibo region’s border. Venezuela signed a joint
declaration in 1905 with Great Britain which legally recognized the border.
Prevost’s allegations do not adequately challenge the legal basis of the 1899
arbitral award. Instead, it revealed the political motives of some members of the tribunal.
The principle of effective occupation which was applied to the case had distinctively
favored Britain’s arguments. Thus, Guyana’s assertion that the border dispute is more of
a ‘controversy’ than a ‘dispute’ itself has substantial merit. Venezuela’s reluctance to
agree to a juridical settlement also introduces a hypothesis. It can be argued that the
Venezuelan government needs to keep the dispute alive in order to divert the attention of
their peoples and rally their support. Historian, Leslie B. Rout had applied this hypothesis
to Guyana in the 1980s.122 He found that Guyanese President, L.F.S Burnham had used
the border dispute successfully in times when the population was divided. Burnham was
able to: (i) divert the people’s attention away from the threats of general strikes by civil
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servants and (ii) condition Guyanese into accepting that the continuance of Burnham’s
authoritarian government would provide security and peace. 123
Rout’s historical analysis parallels the ultra-nationalist views of Venezuelans such
as ex-dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez, who in 1981, admitted that he had planned to
invade the Essequibo region in 1958.124 This ‘invasion hysteria’ was advanced after
Guyana had announced numerous plans to establish settlements for Chinese immigrants
in the region and to award foreign oil companies to explore the Essequibo region. 125
Guyana’s actions violated Article V of the Geneva Agreement and Article IV of the Portof-Spain Protocol but neither the Geneva agreement nor Port-of-Spain protocol made any
provisions for repercussions to breaches of their terms. It can be assumed that breaches
would be addressed through the usual diplomatic channels available for conflict
resolution. However, a right to intervene in the disputed territory, i.e. the use of force for
breaches committed was not anticipated since international law prohibited it.
It seems as though this ‘ultra-nationalist view’ of social justice encompassed the
pragmatic understanding that if Guyana developed the disputed region: (1) any future
attempts

of

Venezuelan

occupation

would

be

difficult, 126

(2)

the

region’s

underdevelopment could no longer be used as propaganda to promote its case for
participating in the region’s development 127 and (3) it would expose the government as
weak against a state that is economically and militarily inferior.
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On the contrary, the dispute’s history shows that Venezuela’s social justice
platform is based entirely on the economic value associated with the Essequibo region.
As identified in Chapter 4, Venezuela only intensifies their claims against the Essequibo
region whenever Guyana pursues economic development within the region. Therefore, it
is presumable that the natural resources contained in the Essequibo region is the major
source of the dispute and not necessarily the arbitral award. Wiegand did suggest that
issue saliency is accountable for the presence of border disputes. Macaulay and Hensel
emphasizes that natural resources ultimately determine whether territories are salient
(valuable) or not. The Essequibo region covers approximately 2/3 of Guyana's
‘sovereign’ territory and contains gold, bauxite, diamonds and other natural resources. A
realist would argue that there is a border dispute between Guyana and Venezuela because
of security and economic interests. For Venezuela, the Essequibo region adds more
territory to its state and would allow this already oil-driven nation to conduct even more
oil explorations on the Essequibo coast. Mineral resources such as diamonds and gold
offer Venezuela the opportunity to exploit these minerals for economic gain. Venezuela’s
acquiescence to Guyana’s development of the region rids it of this opportunity.
Venezuela’s motives are based primarily on the economic value associated with
the region and its ‘social justice’ narrative conceals their true intentions. This is the
argument Guyana has maintained throughout the years. Interestingly enough, Guyana and
Venezuela have sustained bilateral relations despite the border dispute. They have cooperated in education, health care and even global affairs. However, the pattern of
Venezuelan behavior seems to suggest that the Essequibo region becomes a political
dilemma whenever Guyana announces plans to develop the region. For Guyana, the
49
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Essequibo region maintains a strategic importance to its economic development. The
recent oil discovery by ExxonMobil in May 2015 created economic optimism within
Guyana as exclaimed by its Prime Minister, Moses Nagamatoo. 128
Guyana has proclaimed that the border dispute is a distraction ploy by the
Venezuelan government of Nicolas Maduro, whose approval ratings are at a historical
low and has accumulated into a civil unrest within the state. Thus, Maduro’s decree no.
1859 is viewed as a boisterous political attempt to maintain a ‘strongman’ image in the
face of fervent public opposition to his administration. Venezuela prefers bilateral
negotiations and even called for another UN Good Office process which Guyana rejected
immediately. According to the Guyanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carl Greenidge, the
Guyanese government interpreted Venezuela’s actions as a last ditch effort to unify its
divided population and stymie Guyana’s future economic plans for the region.
It is puzzling that Venezuela is adamant that the Essequibo region is rightfully
theirs and the arbitral award was invalid yet it opposes juridical settlement. Venezuela is
yet to provide substantial reasons that support its opposition to juridical settlement.
Instead, it has maintained its predilection for bilateral negotiations. On the other hand,
Guyana has remained open to a juridical settlement which is currently going forward.
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B. Proposed Solutions to the Guyana-Venezuela Border Dispute
1. The International Court of Justice
Guyana has persistently identified the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the
ultimate dispute settlement mechanism capable of resolving the border dispute with
Venezuela. Guyana’s predilection for a juridical settlement was evident after UN
Secretary-General António Guterres had referred the matter to the ICJ, in accordance
with Article IV (2) of the Geneva Agreement 1966. The ICJ requires both parties to a
dispute to consent to its jurisdiction before the matter can be adjudicated. However, it is
unclear whether Article IV (2) of the Geneva Agreement suspends this requirement.


What would be Guyana’s case before the ICJ?

In its application to the ICJ, Guyana requested the court “to confirm the legal
validity and binding effect of the Award Regarding the Boundary between the Colony of
British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela, of 3 October 1899.” 129 Here, Guyana
will argue that under Article XIII of the Treaty of Arbitration, 130 Venezuela agreed that
the arbitral award would be the “full, perfect and final settlement.” Guyana will present
evidence that proves Venezuela did accept the arbitral award. This evidence is
Venezuela’s active participation in a boundary commission between November 1900 and
June 1904 which “identified, demarcated and permanently fixed the boundary established
by the arbitral award.”131 After these actions were completed, Venezuela had signed a
joint declaration on 10 January 1905 (referred to by Guyana as the “1905 Agreement”)
129
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recognizing the validity of the boundary, which effectively ended the border dispute.
Furthermore, Guyana will rely on the principle of uti possidetis which was applied by the
ICJ in the Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea
Intervening) 1994 case. Here, Guyana will argue that it inherited the pre-independence
boundaries set by Great Britain (its former colonial power) and Venezuela in 1905.
I expect Guyana to argue that the Venezuelan government up until 1946 had
declared the matter as a chose jugée and its opposition to the award was only fuelled by
Prevost’s allegations. Guyana will look to convince the ICJ that Prevost’s allegations do
not challenge the legal decision of the tribunal. Instead, these allegations are political and
their veracity has been discredited by many historians. Guyana will inevitably request
that the ICJ avoid this political issue. Last, I anticipate that Guyana will present evidence
that shows it has maintained effective control and sovereign activity over the Essequibo
region. That evidence will most likely be demonstrated by its hosting of regional and
national elections, various developmental and administrative projects within the region.
Thus, Guyana in its case against Venezuela will attempt to convince the ICJ that
Venezuela’s claims against the Essequibo region lack judicial merit. Guyana will
persuade the court to uphold the sanctity of treaties and respect for its sovereignty and
territorial integrity over the Essequibo region.


What would be Venezuela’s case before the ICJ?

I anticipate that Venezuela’s case before the ICJ will rely heavily on one element:
(1) Mallet Prevost’s memorandum. Venezuela will argue that Prevost’s allegations of
‘political manipulation’ and ‘pressure’ by the arbitral tribunal (particularly, the president
of the tribunal and the jurists nominated by Great Britain) should invalidate the arbitral
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award. Venezuela will contend that the award was biased in Great Britain’s favor.
Although, historians have failed to substantiate Prevost’s claims, Venezuela will maintain
that these allegations cast doubt on the “fairness” of the award. I expect Venezuela will
attempt to refer to its historical relationships with Great Britain in the latter half of the
19th century to illustrate the power; Britain supposedly had over the tribunal’s
proceedings. I believe it will be quite complex for the ICJ to comprehend what exactly
are the ‘legal’ grounds Venezuela will argue.


How would the ICJ rule on the Guyana-Venezuela Border Dispute?

The ICJ’s decisions are legally binding. Therefore, states must comply with ICJ
decisions despite the doctrine of sovereignty. The UN Security Council can intervene and
impose sanctions on the non-complying state but rarely if ever does so. In addressing the
Guyana-Venezuela case, I reckon that the ICJ’s decision will place particular emphasis
on treaty law, uti possidetis, and effective control. In Sumner’s Territorial Disputes at the
International Court of Justice, the author suggested that of all the legal principles
available, these 3 principles are commonly applied by the ICJ. Sumner argued that the
ICJ’s hierarchical preference of applying these 3 principles is in the following sequence:
(i) treaty law, (ii) uti possidetis and (iii) effective control.132
In the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Senegal and
Guinea Bissau had requested the ICJ to decide (i) whether an agreement on their
maritime boundary which was concluded by an exchange of letters between France and
Portugal on 26 April 1960 is valid. Previously, the two states had established an arbitral
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tribunal under the Arbitration Agreement dated 12 March 1985. The tribunal was
composed of 3 members who would decide whether the 1960 agreement was valid and if
it was not, the tribunal award would include re-demarcating the boundary. The tribunal
voted in favor of the 1960 agreement. Dissatisfied with the tribunal’s decision, GuineaBissau and Senegal agreed to have the matter heard by the ICJ. Guinea-Bissau argued
that the Award was inexistent and invalid. Guinea-Bissau argued that the president of the
tribunal, who was one of the two arbitrators that voted in favor of the text was said to
have ‘expressed a view in contradiction with the one apparently adopted by the vote,’ in
an affixed declaration.
In rejecting Guinea-Bissau’s argument, the ICJ stated that the president’s
declaration can only be viewed as ‘indication of what he considered would have been a
better course.’133 His declaration was not a blatant contradiction to the tribunal’s decision.
The ICJ did note that the tribunal’s decision can be criticized but the ICJ lacked
jurisdiction to dictate the politics of the tribunal. Instead, it emphasized that the tribunal
had the authority to decide the case and apply what principles it seemed fit, in accordance
with the Arbitral Agreement 1985.
In the Guyana and Venezuela case, there is high probability that the ICJ will refer
to this case when making its decision. The 1899 arbitral award had decided the outcome
of the border dispute and it was accepted by both states. Similar to Guinea-Bissau,
Venezuela will rely on a memorandum (Prevost) which alleged the political bias by
members of the tribunal. However, I expect that the ICJ will find that the Prevost
memorandum does not challenge the legality of the award itself. Instead, this ‘political
133
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compromise’ should have been prohibited by the tribunal. The ICJ should analyze the
tribunal’s decision which invoked the doctrine of effective occupation (argued by Great
Britain). I anticipate that no fundamental challenges will be introduced against this
principle. Thus, the ICJ will most likely exercise restraint at questioning the validity of
the arbitral award 1899. As Sumner stated, by protecting states’ harmonized expectations
about border placement, the ICJ’s decision to uphold international treaties may be to
restore predictability and stability to the international system in territorial disputes. 134
Moreover, the ICJ may look at the principle of uti possidetis as identified in the
Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening)
1994 dispute. Here, Cameroon lodged proceedings against Nigeria, focusing generally on
sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula and the Lake Chad region. The ICJ found that the
1929–1930 Thomson-Marchand Declaration, to which the United Kingdom and France
(former colonial powers) had signed, provided a detailed delimitation of the interstate
border. The ICJ found particularly persuasive the United Nations Trusteeships over
Nigeria and Cameroon after World War II. It referred explicitly to the ThomsonMarchand Declaration and the exchange of diplomatic notes that made the Declaration a
legal international agreement.135 Similarly, the Lake Chad Basin Commission had
supported the Declaration’s delimitation of the disputed frontier. This evidence was
admissible towards the ICJ’s rejection of Nigeria’s claim.
In the Guyana and Venezuela case, I would assume that the ICJ would rule that
the joint declaration by the commissioners which was signed on 10 January 1905 after the
134
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arbitral award had established a boundary commission (composed of Venezuelan and
British surveyors) is valid. Venezuela’s signature had confirmed its approval of the
Essequibo boundary. There is no evidence that indicates Venezuela acted under duress
when signing the declaration. Thus, Guyana’s subsequent and effective control (after
independence) over the Essequibo region could not be replaced by Venezuela’s
unverified claims. The ICJ should reckon that the signed declaration between Venezuela
and Great Britain (former colonial power of Guyana) in 1905 was based on the relevant
facts and laws utilized by the arbitral tribunal. Thus, the acquisition of the Essequibo
region by Guyana after independence was in accordance with international law.
If the ICJ rules in Guyana’s favor, the decision will become legally binding
between Guyana and Venezuela. Thus, the arbitral award would maintain its legitimacy
under international law. Nevertheless, enforcement will be of major concern for Guyana
and the rest of the international community. It is anticipated that Venezuela may claim
that the ICJ is biased because it purposefully ignored or downplayed the Prevost
memorandum’s allegations. Although Venezuela’s criticisms of the ICJ’s decision (which
most likely will happen) would support Posner and Figueirido’s study on ICJ bias,
Venezuela’s decision to comply or not is key. It is anticipated that the UN Security
Council would establish a mechanism to monitor Venezuela’s decision to comply or not.
Any further acts of Venezuelan aggression against Guyana’s Essequibo region would
then constitute a threat to peace. Furthermore, non-compliance may result in the UN
Security Council imposing sanctions on Venezuela’s already weakened economy.
Sanctions can cripple the country and even cause a humanitarian crisis. Compliance
would ultimately be the best political decision for the Maduro regime to make.
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For Guyana, the ICJ’s positive decision would strengthen its territorial
sovereignty. It would finally settle a dispute that Guyana has viewed as a ‘controversy’
for many years. The ICJ’s decision can end the Geneva Agreement. Moreover, Guyana
could continue to exercise its sovereignty over the Essequibo region. Major economic
activities such as oil exploration off the Essequibo coast and other developmental projects
could be pursued within the region without any aggressive acts from Venezuela. Last,
Guyana could reassure investors that their investments in the Essequibo region are
subject to Guyanese law only.
2. Mediation by a Possible State: Norway
With the threat of territorial conflict between Guyana and Venezuela at a minimal
level, mediation can be an alternative to resolve this dispute before the dispute might
escalate. Venezuela has persistently approved of bilateral negotiations as the ideal dispute
mechanism. Moreover, Venezuela had requested another UN Good Offices process but as
noted, Guyana rejected this measure. If mediation is to be pursued, the status of the
mediator is important. Norway was selected as a possible state because of its international
reputation at promoting peace. For Norway, the Oslo Accords on the Middle East marked
a milestone for its reputation as peace facilitator.136 Norway’s role in the secret
negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization that culminated in
the 1993 agreements signed in Washington, D.C. placed the country on the exclusive map
of world diplomatic powers.137
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How effective are Norway’s mediation techniques?

Norwegian peace mediation is characterized by a particular set of qualities – noncoercion, impartiality, disinterest, respect of local ownership and commitment to peace
both short and long term. These characteristics are combined with close collaboration
from Norwegian civil society (non-governmental organizations and the research
community) to provide financial resources and long-term commitment to peace. 138
However, a close analysis of Norway’s success depends primarily on (1) success
measured in terms of facilitating a dialogue between conflict parties (”sit down and
talk”); (2) success measured in terms of the signing of a peace agreement between the
conflict actors (“negative peace”); and (3) success measured in terms of the peaceful
transformation of the conditions that made conflict possible (“positive peace”). 139

Introduce Dialogue
between the conflicting
states

Signing of Peace
Agreement

Implementation of
short term and long
term goals of Peace
Agreement

Figure 11: Norway’s Mediation Technique
Unfortunately, the Oslo Accords did not resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict.
However, it did encourage dialogue and the signing of a peace agreement. The political,
cultural and religious dynamics that are endogenous to the conflict thwarted the
implementation of those conditions in the Oslo Accords which were necessary to achieve
peace. In Sri Lanka, Norway’s reputation was damaged. Norway’s involvement in the
negotiations of a peace settlement between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil Tigers
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had purportedly intensified the conflict instead of safeguarding the peaceful
transformation of conditions within Sri Lanka. Norway did help to institute a ceasefire
which prevented 1000s of citizens from being killed. However, Norway was accused of
supporting the rebel’s desire to secede from Sri Lanka and for usurping the mandate of a
UN based observation mission.140


Norway’s Mediation in the Guyana and Venezuela Dispute: would it be
effective?

Kleiboer listed: (1) ripeness of the conflict, (2) the level of conflict intensity and
(3) nature of the issue, as the three factors which impact mediation outcomes. There is no
current physical conflict between the Guyana and Venezuela. However, there were
sporadic military actions by both nations in the 1970s and 1980s. None have satisfied the
threshold that warrants international reaction. It does not contain any cultural or religious
variables and its level of intensity is low. Last, the nature of the issues is political and
economic. The dispute targets the validity of the 1899 arbitral award.
Renewed dialogue between Guyana and Venezuela is only possible if Norway can
actually influence both nations to refrain from and put an end to their political campaigns
that advocate for possession of the Essequibo region. Given the current status of the
dispute, Norway would inevitably encounter a challenge. History has shown that both
nations have maintained their extreme political positions on the dispute. Both nations fear
that by relaxing their political campaigns, the public will view their governments as weak
and unpatriotic. Politically, such actions can prevent the current governments from being
re-elected. Thus, the political risks are high for both nations.
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Guyana has maintained that Venezuela’s claims are only intensified whenever
economic development is pursued within the Essequibo region. On the other hand,
Venezuela has argued in support of ‘social justice.’ Most interesting, UN SecretaryGeneral António Guterres selected a Norwegian envoy to lead the 4 th UN Good Offices
process between the two nations. The process failed because Guyana refused to cede any
Essequibian territory to Venezuela. Guyana voiced its lack of faith in dialogue in many
press releases. Thus, the mediation strategy of communication and its timing are probably
not applicable given Guyana’s insistence on a juridical settlement and the current
political instability that grips Venezuela. Guyana would argue that ceding any of its
territory would be a violation of its sovereignty. Furthermore, the Guyanese government
would face criticism from its nationalistic populace. Ceding territory to Venezuela would
be described as unpatriotic. Moreover, Amerindian communities in the Essequibo region
which complain consistently about harassment from Venezuelan gangs would refuse to
become subjects under Venezuelan law.
Wiegand’s hypothesis: the higher the levels of tangible saliency of disputed
territory, the less likely states pursue mediation as a disputed resolution strategy becomes
relevant. In testing Wiegand’s hypothesis, the presence of bauxite, gold, diamonds and oil
off the Essequibo coast can deter the likelihood of mediation as a dispute resolution
strategy. Previous research contradicted this hypothesis by arguing that mediation can be
successful once the disputed territory has tangible saliency but is divisible. I agree with
Wiegand that the mediation’s success is still not likely. Moreover, I concur that bilateral
negotiations are more suited for territory with tangible value since compromise and
concessions are easier to achieve. However, the history of bilateral negotiations between
60
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Guyana and Venezuela has proven that a compromise is based on the political will of the
two nations. Given the history of this dispute, there is doubt about Wiegand’s conclusion.
Any proposal of ceding territory to Venezuela will be rejected by Guyana
outright. Guyana will argue on the principles of effective occupation under international
law. Most importantly, Guyana will maintain that Venezuela had signed and accepted the
1899 arbitral award. On the contrary, Venezuela may be open to accepting some territory
from Guyana, once it contains those valuable mineral resources. The division of territory
to ensure Venezuela has adequate resources will be intricate to resolve. If dialogue
pertaining to giving up territory is immediately dismissed by Guyana, the success of
Norway’s mediation technique which relies heavily on dialogue is already defeated.
Thus, mediation as much as it is a preferred dispute solution mechanism seems to exhaust
its effectiveness in this dispute. Any potential dialogue leading to a peace agreement is
realistically convoluted given that the dispute was referred to the ICJ. However, Guyana
and Venezuela can always settle the dispute outside the court.
3. Permanent Court of Arbitration
The possibility of Venezuela abstaining from court proceedings at the ICJ must be
considered. The ICJ requires states to consent to its jurisdiction but their appearance
before the court is also intrinsic. On the other hand, a bilateral or multilateral treaty which
is signed between states and includes a dispute settlement clause, often an arbitral clause,
may vividly provide whether non-appearance would constitute a bar to court proceedings.
China’s absence from proceedings in the South China Sea Arbitration PCA Case (No
2013-19) did not affect the POA’s ability to adjudicate under UNCLOS. Article 9 of
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UNCLOS Annex VII provides that absence or failure of a party to defend its case shall
not constitute a bar to the proceedings.
The Geneva Agreement does not address arbitration or provide any procedural
rules on arbitration between Guyana and Venezuela. Thus, it is difficult to definitively
determine whether Guyana or Venezuela’s absence from the PCA would thwart
proceedings. The PCA was selected because its procedural rules and flexibility give it a
comparative advantage over the ICJ. Article 44 and 45 of the 1907 Convention for the
Pacific Resolution of International Disputes provides for the contracting parties (in this
case, Guyana and Venezuela) to select two arbitrators of their own (one of whom may be
a national of the party concerned) and the four selected arbitrators choose the fifth and
presiding arbitrator. This composition bears similarity to the 1899 tribunal.
Although, the PCA may also invoke natural justice and equitable principles when
hearing a case, the facts of the dispute often shape the tribunal’s behavior. Similar to the
ICJ, the Guyana and Venezuela case will be based on the ‘legality’ of the 1899 arbitral
award. The PCA may consider Prevost allegations as a factor when determining the
‘fairness’ of the award. Thus, the PCA’s case would focus on the tribunal itself and
whether the award was fair.
This issue was brought up in the The Government of Sudan / The Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Army (Abyei Arbitration) case. In 2008, the Government of Sudan
and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) agreed to submit their
dispute concerning the boundaries of the oil-rich Abyei area to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA). Under the Arbitration Agreement (signed between the two entities),
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the issue before the PCA was to determine whether the ‘Abyei Boundaries commission,’
had exceeded their mandate which was ‘to define (i.e., delimit) and demarcate the area of
the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905’ as stated in the Abyei
Protocol.141 A resolution was necessary for the 2011 referendum on South Sudan’s
independence. If it did exceed its mandate, Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement
empowered the PCA to make a declaration to that effect, and proceed to delimit the
boundaries of the aforementioned area.
In reaching its decision, the PCA relied on a general principle of law. That
principle states that traditional rights are not extinguished by boundary delimitations,
unless there is an explicit prohibition to do so. 142 An early doctrinal foundation of the
principle that customary rights ‘survive’ the transfer of territorial title was provided in the
Right of Passage case, where the ICJ recognized that Portugal continued to enjoy certain
rights of passage over Indian territory that used to be Portuguese. 143 Section 1.1.3 of the
Abyei Protocol had confirmed the continued application of this principle. It provides for
the Misseriya and other nomadic peoples to retain their traditional rights to graze cattle
and move across the territory of Abyei.144
Therefore, the PCA found that ABC Experts did not exceed their mandate in
adopting a ‘tribal’ interpretation of the commission, but had exceeded the mandate by
failing to give sufficient reasons for their conclusions regarding the northern shared
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boundary and the eastern and western boundaries.145 Subsequently, the PCA became a
part of the peace process. Its responsibility was to reduce the size of the region and give
greater territorial control to the Government of Sudan to the areas containing oil fields.
The Arbitration Agreement signed between the Government of Sudan and the
SPLM had authorized the PCA to take such actions based on a balance of probabilities. It
was not a feature of the PCA to do so. The Geneva Agreement between Guyana and
Venezuela does not contain any provisions that cover arbitration. Thus, the PCA would
only be effective if Guyana and Venezuela decide to establish an arbitration agreement,
similar to the one in the Abyei Arbitration case.
An arbitration agreement between Guyana and Venezuela would empower the
PCA to adjudicate the case on the ‘fairness and legality’ of the award. I would presume
that the PCA would most likely rule in Guyana’s favor if the dispute. Venezuela’s
inability to succinctly provide evidence that accredits the allegations of Prevost’s
memorandum cannot challenge the ‘fairness’ of the award. Guyana’s arguments would be
similar to those that will be used presumably in the ICJ. Fairness may be evaluated based
on the evidence presented before the 1899 arbitral tribunal (at the time) and not
necessarily the motives of the tribunal. Legality will be analyzed based on the ‘effective
occupation’ principle under international law.

145

Reports of International Arbitral Awards, p. 384

64

Guyana-Venezuela Border Dispute: Seeking a Peaceful Solution

C. ICJ, Mediation or Permanent Court of Arbitration: Which is most effective?
The effectiveness of these dispute settlement mechanisms can be evaluated based
on two criteria: (1) the current relationships of states that utilized these mechanisms and
(2) compliance with the agreement/decision made. The binding nature of a juridical
settlement does not immediately ‘resolve’ a dispute per se. Resolution extends beyond a
decision being made. It encompasses a complete understanding and commitment that the
dispute has ended, its decision will be complied with and actions that are necessary to
enforce its resolution will be implemented.
In analyzing the cases before the ICJ, I found that the ICJ’s strict application of
legal principles eliminates the political elements that are intrinsic in territorial disputes. In
some territorial disputes, cultural or religious factors have created an ‘endogenous
imperfection’ within the relations of some states. Therefore, some territorial disputes are
outside the realm of international law because the ICJ does not account for religious or
cultural history when making a decision. For example, the Israel-Palestine conflict is the
most intractable dispute today. The ICJ has only provided an advisory opinion on the
legal consequences of Israel’s construction of a border wall on occupied Palestine
territory. This opinion did not have any effect on the dispute but it did harm Israel’s
image worldwide. Currently, Israel and Palestine are embroiled in conflicts because the
territorial dispute extends beyond a legal paradigm.
The Cameroon-Nigeria dispute that was brought before the ICJ eased the tensions
momentarily between the two nations after a short period of conflict. The strict
application of uti possidetis had assisted the UN and governments of both states to
demarcate the border. By delimiting the border, Nigeria, Cameroon's biggest economic
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partner in sub-Saharan Africa had commenced talks to construct cross-border roads to
support the fishing trade. They are also in the process of establishing an agreement for
joint management of oil resources in the Bakassi area. 146 However, as of 2018, the crossborder region has been riddled with conflict from separatists who have attacked
Cameroonians at the border or crossing it. 147
The Permanent Court of Arbitration may not be as strict as the ICJ when settling
disputes. However, its effectiveness depends entirely on the treaty that governs the
relationship between the contracting parties. Although, the PCA had made a decision on
the Abyei region of Sudan, the process of delimitation has not commenced. There was no
instrument that defined a ‘resident of Abyei’ for the purposes of voting in the Abyei
referendum 2011. Consequently, the conflict between the Sudanese government and
SPLM within the region has intensified once more. However, literature has illustrated
that the PCA’s effectiveness is high in maritime cases. This is due in part to the
provisions of UNCLOS which provide comprehensive information on those principles
that are associated with maritime and sea relations. Though the PCA’s decision is
binding, its enforcement mechanism is non-existent. China’s rejection of the ruling in the
China-Philippines Arbitration case casts doubt on the tribunal’s ability to encourage
compliance with its ruling.
In selecting a dispute mechanism for the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute, it is
imperative to address the position of each state on a balance of merits. Guyana’s firmness
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on the validity of the 1899 arbitral award is economically and politically significant for
the development of the country. Venezuela’s concern that the 1899 arbitral award was
flawed with irregularities is also valid. Bilateral negotiations between the two states have
only contributed to the signing of the Geneva Agreement and Port-of-Spain Protocol.
These instruments have not yielded any progress towards resolving the dispute per se.
Even the UN Good Offices, which relies on mediation failed to achieve any substantial
progress that could advocate mediation as a potential dispute settlement strategy.
The UN Secretary-General’s decision to refer the dispute to the ICJ showed that
mediation was no longer viable and that a juridical settlement was the last alternative
available. Judicial settlements are unpopular due to the zero-sum scenario (winner/loser
situation) they create. However, they assure the international community and non-state
actors that a decision based on international law can be made. Thus, I argue that the ICJ,
in its capacity and given the current developments of the dispute is the most effective
dispute settlement mechanism available among the three mechanisms analyzed.
Following a decision from the ICJ, Guyana and Venezuela should establish a
Mixed Commission, similar to the commission set up in 1905 to clearly delineate the
western border of the Essequibo region. Moreover, it should oversee the removal of
Venezuelan military personnel from the Guyanese half of the Ankoko Island since their
occupation would be illegal under international law. The Commission’s mandate would
enforce the ICJ’s decision on this dispute and reassure the boundaries of the nations. I
anticipate that Venezuela may boycott this initiative. Given that the ICJ decision would
most likely favor Guyana, Venezuela would refuse to contribute resources and personnel
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to participate in such activity. Consequently, Venezuela’s omission would immediately
put an end to collaborative efforts of demarcation.
How the ICJ might adjudicate this case and the consequences that would follow
after a decision is made, will incur global interest on how future territorial disputes will
be handled, in Latin America, the African region or elsewhere. Guyana remains
optimistic and confident that the decision would be in their favor. This optimism is
reflected in the range of development projects they have slated for the Essequibo region.
However, Venezuela’s opposition to the ICJ, in the face of hostile political instability
may damage Venezuela’s image. Moreover, there is a legitimate concern that if the
decision does not favor Venezuela, a conflict may ripen by those ultra-nationalists in
Venezuela, encouraging Venezuelans to take actions against Guyana. Thus, finding a
peaceful solution to this dispute is essential as it would avoid such an escalation that
would benefit neither party.
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Appendix

Members of the 1899 tribunal (From left to right): Justice Brewer, Lord Russell, Prof
Martens, Chief Justice Fuller, Lord Justice Collins

Punch newspaper cartoon shows Lord Salisbury of England (chuckling). "I like
arbitration — In the PROPER PLACE!" after the 1899 arbitral award was given
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An excerpt from Mallet Prevost’s memorandum

Guyanese illustration (which appeared in a local newspaper) showing Venezuela’s
occupation of the Ankoko Island, in defiance of Guyanese President, L.F.S. Burnham’s
‘not one blade of grass’ campaign
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An excerpt from the popular, “Not a Blade of Grass,” song, performed by Guyanese
band, Tradewinds.

Flags of Venezuela (Left) and Guyana (right)

Guyanese ranks stand alongside Guyana and Venezuela boundary marker after the
demarcation exercise was undertaken by a boundary commission from 1900-1905.
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UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon (at that time) meets with Venezuelan President,
Nicolás Maduro (left) and Guyanese President, David Granger (right)

UN Secretary-General (at the time), Ban Ki-Moon poses alongside Venezuelan President,
Nicolas Maduro (Left) and Guyanese President, David Granger (Right): No substantial
progress on dialogue was made on the border dispute

Guyana’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carl Greenidge (right) poses with Philippe
Couvreur, Registrar of the ICJ (left) after submitting Guyana’s application to the
ICJ
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PART XXV
_______________

Award regarding the Boundary between
the Colony of British Guiana and
the United States of Venezuela

Decision of 3 October 1899

_______________

Sentence arbitrale relative à la frontière
entre la colonie de Guyane britannique
et les États-Unis du Venezuela

Décision du 3 octobre 1899

AWARD OF THE TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION CONSTITUTED
UNDER ARTICLE I OF THE TREATY OF ARBITRATION SIGNED AT
WASHINGTON, BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES OF VENEZUELA, REGARDING THE BOUNDARY
BETWEEN THE COLONY OF BRITISH GUIANA AND THE UNITED
STATES OF VENEZUELA, DECISION OF 3 OCTOBER 1899 ∗
SENTENCE DU TRIBUNAL ARBITRAL, ÉTABLI EN VERTU DE
L’ARTICLE I DU TRAITÉ D’ARBITRAGE, SIGNÉ À WASHINGTON,
ENTRE LA GRANDE BRETAGNE ET LES ÉTATS-UNIS DU
VENEZUELA, RELATIVE À LA FRONTIÈRE ENTRE LA COLONIE
DE GUYANE BRITANNIQUE ET LES ÉTATS-UNIS DU VENEZUELA,
DÉCISION DU 3 OCTOBRE 1899 ∗∗
Determination of borders – question of the boundary-line between the Colony of British
Guiana and the United States of Venezuela.
Maintenance of navigation rights for merchant ships of all nations on rivers Amakuru and
Barima – rights of British and Venezuelan ships on shared rivers.

Délimitation frontalière – question de la ligne frontière entre la colonie de la Guyane
britannique et les États-Unis du Venezuela.
Conservation des droits de navigation pour les navires marchands de toutes les nations sur
les fleuves Amakuru et Barima – droits des navires britanniques et vénézuéliens sur les fleuves
transfrontaliers.

*****

WHEREAS, on the 2nd day of February, 1897, a Treaty of Arbitration was
concluded between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland and the United States of Venezuela in the terms
following:—
Ratifications exchanged at Washington, June 14, 1897.
HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, and the United States of Venezuela, being desirous to provide for an
amicable settlement of the question which has arisen between their respective
Governments concerning the boundary between the Colony of British Guiana
__________
∗
Reprinted from British and Foreign State Papers, Compiled by The Librarian and Keeper
of the Papers, Foreign Office, vol. 92, London, 1903, H. M. Stationery Office, p.160.
∗∗
Reproduit de British and Foreign State Papers, Compilé par The Librarian and Keeper of
the Papers, Foreign Office, vol. 92, London, 1903, H. M. Stationery Office, p.160.
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and the United States of Venezuela, have resolved to submit to arbitration the
question involved, and to the end of concluding a Treaty for that purpose have
appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, the Right Honourable Sir Julian Pauncefote, a Member of Her
Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the
Most Honourable Order of the Bath and of the Most Distinguished Order of
St. Michael and St. George, and Her Majesty’s Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary to the United States;
And the President of the United States of Venezuela, Señor José Andrade,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Venezuela to the United
States of America;
Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers,
which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed to and concluded
the following Articles: —
ART. I. An Arbitral Tribunal shall be immediately appointed to
determine the boundary-line between the Colony of British Guiana and the
United States of Venezuela.
II. The Tribunal shall consist of five Jurists: two on the part of Great
Britain, nominated by the members of the Judicial Committee of Her
Majesty’s Privy Council, namely, the Right Honourable Baron Herschell,
Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, and the
Honourable Sir Richard Henn Collins, Knight, one of the Justices of Her
Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature; two on the part of
Venezuela, nominated, one by the President of the United States of Venezuela,
namely, the Honourable Melville Western Fuller, Chief Justice of the United
States of America, and one nominated by the Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States of America, namely, the Honourable David Josiah Brewer, a
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States of America; and of a fifth
Jurist to be selected by the four persons so nominated, or in the event of their
failure to agree within three months from the date of the exchange of
ratifications of the present Treaty, to be selected by His Majesty the King of
Sweden and Norway. The Jurist so selected shall be President of the Tribunal.
In case of the death, absence, or incapacity to serve of any of the four
Arbitrators above named, or in the event of any such Arbitrator omitting or
declining or ceasing to act as such, another Jurist of repute shall be forthwith
substituted in his place. If such vacancy shall occur among those nominated
on the part of Great Britain, the substitute shall be appointed by the members
for the time being of the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty’s Privy Council,
acting by a majority, and if among those nominated on the part of Venezuela,
he shall be appointed by the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States, acting by a majority. If such vacancy shall occur in the case of the
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fifth Arbitrator, a substitute shall be selected in the manner herein provided
for with regard to the original appointment.
III. The Tribunal shall investigate and ascertain the extent of the
territories belonging to, or that might lawfully be claimed by, the United
Netherlands or by the Kingdom of Spain respectively at the time of the
acquisition by Great Britain of the Colony of British Guiana, and shall
determine the boundary-line between the Colony of British Guiana and the
United States of Venezuela.
IV. In deciding the matters submitted, the Arbitrators shall ascertain all
facts which they deem necessary to a decision of the controversy, and shall be
governed by the following Rules, which are agreed upon by the High
Contracting Parties as Rules to be taken as applicable to the case, and by such
principles of international law not inconsistent therewith as the Arbitrators
shall determine to be applicable to the case: —
Rules.
(a.) Adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years shall
make a good title. The Arbitrators may deem exclusive political control
of a district, as well as actual settlement thereof, sufficient to constitute
adverse holding or to make title by prescription.
(b.) The Arbitrators may recognize and give effect to rights and claims
resting on any other ground whatever valid according to international law,
and on any principles of international law which the Arbitrators may
deem to be applicable to the case, and which are not in contravention of
the foregoing rule.
(c.) In determining the boundary-line, if territory of one Party be found by
the Tribunal to have been at the date of this Treaty in the occupation of
the subjects or citizens of the other Party, such effect shall be given to
such occupation as reason, justice, the principles of international law, and
the equities of the case shall, in the opinion of the Tribunal, require.
V. The Arbitrators shall meet at Paris, within sixty days after the delivery
of the printed arguments mentioned in Article VIII, and shall proceed
impartially and carefully to examine and decide the questions that have been,
or shall be, laid before them, as herein provided, on the part of the
Governments of Her Britannic Majesty and the United States of Venezuela
respectively.
Provided always that the Arbitrators may, if they shall think fit, hold their
meetings, or any of them, at any other place which they may determine.
All questions considered by the Tribunal, including the final decision,
shall be determined by a majority of all the Arbitrators.
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Each of the High Contracting Parties shall name one person as its Agent
to attend the Tribunal, and to represent it generally in all matters connected
with the Tribunal.
VI. The printed Case of each of the two Parties, accompanied by the
documents, the official correspondence, and other evidence on which each
relies, shall be delivered in duplicate to each of the Arbitrators and to the
Agent of the other Party as soon as may be after the appointment of the
members of the Tribunal, but within a period not exceeding eight months from
the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty.
VII. Within four months after the delivery on both sides of the printed
Case, either Party may in like manner deliver in duplicate to each of the said
Arbitrators, and to the Agent of the other Party, a Counter-Case, and
additional documents, correspondence, and evidence, in reply to the Case,
documents, correspondence, and evidence so presented by the other Party.
If in the Case submitted to the Arbitrators either Party shall have
specified or alluded to any report or document, in its own exclusive
possession, without annexing a copy, such Party shall be bound, if the other
Party thinks proper to apply for it, to furnish that Party with a copy thereof,
and either Party may call upon the other, through the Arbitrators, to produce
the originals or certified copies of any papers adduced as evidence, giving in
each instance notice thereof within thirty days after delivery of the Case, and
the original or copy so requested shall be delivered as soon as may be, and
within a period not exceeding forty days after receipt of notice.
VIII. It shall be the duty of the Agent of each Party, within three months
after the expiration of the time limited for the delivery of the Counter-Case on
both sides, to deliver in duplicate to each of the said Arbitrators, and to the
Agent of the other Party, a printed Argument showing the points, and referring
to the evidence upon which his Government relies, and either Party may also
support the same before the Arbitrators by oral argument of Counsel; and the
Arbitrators may, if they desire further elucidation with regard to any point,
require a written or printed statement or argument, or oral argument by
Counsel upon it; but in such case the other Party shall be entitled to reply
either orally or in writing, as the case may be.
IX. The Arbitrators may, for any cause deemed by them sufficient,
enlarge either of the periods fixed by Articles VI, VII, and VIII by the
allowance of thirty days additional.
X. The decision of the Tribunal shall, if possible, be made within three
months from the close of the argument on both sides.
It shall be made in writing and dated, and shall be signed by the
Arbitrators who may assent to it.
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The decision shall be in duplicate, one copy whereof shall be delivered to
the Agent of Great Britain for his Government, and the other copy shall be
delivered to the Agent of the United States of Venezuela for his Government.
XI. The Arbitrators shall keep an accurate record of their proceedings,
and may appoint and employ the necessary officers to assist them.
XII. Each Government shall pay its own Agent and provide for the proper
remuneration of the Counsel employed by it, and of the Arbitrators appointed
by it or in its behalf, and for the expense of preparing and submitting its case
to the Tribunal. All other expenses connected with the Arbitration shall be
defrayed by the two Governments in equal moities.
XIII. The High Contracting Parties engage to consider the result of the
proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration as a full, perfect, and final
settlement of all the questions referred to the Arbitrators.
XIV. The present Treaty shall be duly ratified by Her Britannic Majesty
and by the President of the United States of Venezuela, by and with the
approval of the Congress thereof, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in
London or in Washington within six months from the date hereof.
In faith whereof we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this
Treaty, and have hereunto affixed our seals.
Done in duplicate at Washington, the 2nd day of February, 1897.
(L.S.)
JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE.

(L.S.)
JOSÉ ANDRADE

And whereas the said Treaty was duly ratified, and the ratifications were
duly exchanged in Washington on the 14th day of June, 1897, in conformity
with the said Treaty;
And whereas since the date of the said Treaty, and before the arbitration
thereby contemplated had been entered upon, the said Right Honourable
Baron Herschell departed this life;
And whereas the Right Honourable Charles Baron Russell of Killowen,
Lord Chief Justice of England, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished
Order of St. Michael and St. George has, conformably to the terms of the said
Treaty, been duly nominated by the members of the Judicial Committee of
Her Majesty’s Privy Council to act under the said Treaty in the place and
stead of the said late Baron Herschell;
And whereas the said four Arbitrators, namely: the said Right Honourable
Lord Russell of Killowen, the Right Honourable Sir Richard Henn Collins, the
Honourable Melville Weston Fuller, and the Honourable David Josiah Brewer,
have, conformably to the terms of the said Treaty, selected his Excellency
Frederic de Martens, Privy Councillor, Permanent Member of the Council of
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Russia, LL.D. of the Universities of
Cambridge and Edinburgh, to be the fifth Arbitrator;
And whereas the said Arbitrators have duly entered upon the said
Arbitration, and have duly heard and considered the oral and written
arguments of the Counsel representing respectively Her Majesty the Queen
and the United States of Venezuela, and have impartially and carefully
examined the questions laid before them, and have investigated and
ascertained the extent of the territories belonging to or that might lawfully be
claimed by the United Netherlands or by the Kingdom of Spain respectively at
the time of the acquisition by Great Britain of the Colony of British Guiana:
Now we, the undersigned Arbitrators, do hereby make and publish our
decision, determination, and award of, upon, and concerning the questions
submitted to us by the said Treaty of Arbitration, finally decide, award, and
determine that the boundary-line between the Colony of British Guiana and
the United States of Venezuela is as follows: —
Starting from the coast at Point Playa, the line of boundary shall run in a
straight line to the River Barima at its junction with the River Mururuma, and
thence along the mid-stream of the latter river to its source, and from that
point to the junction of the River Haiowa with the Amakuru, and thence along
the mid-stream of the Amakuru to its source in the Imataka Ridge, and thence
in a south-westerly direction along the highest ridge of the spur of the Imataka
Mountains to the highest point of the main range of such Imataka Mountains
opposite to the source of the Barima, and thence along the summit of the main
ridge in a south-easterly direction of the Imataka Mountains to the source of
the Acarabisi, and thence along the mid-stream of the Acarabisi to the Cuyuni,
and thence along the northern bank of the River Cuyuni westward to its
junction with the Wenamu, and thence following the mid-stream of the
Wenamu to its westernmost source, and thence in a direct line to the summit
of Mount Roraima, and from Mount Roraima to the source of the Cotinga, and
along the mid-stream of that river to its junction with the Takutu, and thence
along the mid-stream of the Takutu to its source, thence in a straight line to
the westernmost point of the Akarai Mountains, and thence along the ridge of
the Akarai Mountains to the source of the Corentin called the Cutari River:
Provided always that the line of delimitation fixed by this Award shall be
subject and without prejudice to any questions now existing, or which may
arise, to be determined between the Government of Her Britannic Majesty and
the Republic of Brazil, or between the latter Republic and the United States of
Venezuela.
In fixing the above delimitation, the Arbitrators consider and decide that
in times of peace the Rivers Amakuru and Barima shall be open to navigation
by the merchant-ships of all nations, subject to all just regulations and to the
payment of light or other like dues: Provided that the dues charged by the
Republic of Venezuela and the Government of the Colony of British Guiana
in respect of the passage of vessels along the portions of such rivers
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respectively owned by them shall be charged at the same rates upon the
vessels of Venezuela and Great Britain, such rates being no higher than those
charged to any other nation: Provided also that no customs duties shall be
chargeable either by the Republic of Venezuela or by the Colony of British
Guiana in respect of goods carried on board ships, vessels, or boats passing
along the said rivers; but customs duties shall only be chargeable in respect of
goods landed in the territory of Venezuela or Great Britain respectively.
Executed and published in duplicate by us in Paris, this 3rd day of
October, A.D. 1899.
F. DE MARTENS.
MELVILLE WESTON FULLER.
DAVID J. BREWER.
RUSSELL OF KN.
R. HENN COLLINS.

No. 8192

VENEZUELA
and
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND
Agreement to resolve the controversy over the frontier
between Venezuela and British Guiana. Signed at
Geneva, on 17 February 1966
Official texts : Spanish and English.
Registered by Venezuela on 5 May 1966.

VENEZUELA
et
ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE
ET D'IRLANDE DU NORD
Accord tendant à régler le différend relatif à la frontière
entre le Venezuela et la Guyane britannique. Signé à
Genève, le 17 février 1966
Textes officiels espagnol et anglais.
Enregistr par le Venezuela le 5 mai 1966.
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No. 8192. AGREEMENT * TO RESOLVE THE CONTROVER
SY BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND THE UNITED KING
DOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
OVER THE FRONTIER BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND
BRITISH GUIANA. SIGNED AT GENEVA, ON 17 FEB
RUARY 1966

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, in consultation with the Government of British Guiana, and the
Government of Venezuela ;
Taking into account the forthcoming independence of British Guiana ;
Recognising that closer cooperation between British Guiana and Venezuela
could bring benefit to both countries ;
Convinced that any outstanding controversy between the United King
dom and British Guiana on the one hand and Venezuela on the other would
prejudice the furtherance of such cooperation and should therefore be amicably
resolved in a manner acceptable to both parties ;
In conformity with the agenda that was agreed for the governmental
conversations concerning the controversy between Venezuela and the Uni
ted Kingdom over the frontier with British Guiana, in accordance with the
joint communiqu of 7 November, 1963, have reached the following agree
ment to resolve the present controversy :
Article I
A Mixed Commission shall be established with the task of seeking satis
factory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy between
Venezuela and the United Kingdom which has arisen as the result of the
Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 a about the frontier
between British Guiana and Venezuela is null and void.
Article II
(1) Within two months of the entry into force of this Agreement, two
representatives shall be appointed to the Mixed Commission by the Govern
ment of British Guiana and two by the Government of Venezuela.
(2) The Government appointing a representative may at any time replace
him, and shall do so immediately should one or both of its representatives
be unable to act through illness or death or any other cause.
1 Came into force on 17 February 1966, the date of signature, in accordance with article VII.
1 British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 92, p. 160 (see also United Kingdom : Treaty
Series No. 5 (1897), C. 8439, for text of Treaty of 2 February 1897).
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(3) The Mixed Commission may by agreement between the representa
tives appoint experts to assist the Mixed Commission, either generally or in
relation to any individual matter under consideration by the Mixed Commis
sion.
Article III
The Mixed Commission shall present interim reports at intervals of six
months from the date of its first meeting.
Article IV
(1) If, within a period of four years from the date of this Agreement, the
Mixed Commission should not have arrived at a full agreement for the solu
tion of the controversy it shall, in its final report, refer to the Government
of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela any outstanding questions.
Those Governments shall without delay choose one of the means of peaceful
settlement provided in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
(2) If, within three months of receiving the final report, the Govern
ment of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela should not have reached
agreement regarding the choice of one of the means of settlement provided
in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, they shall refer the decision
as to the means of settlement to an appropriate international organ upon which
they both agree or, failing agreement on this point, to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. If the means so chosen do not lead to a solution of
the controversy, the said organ or, as the case may be, the Secretary-General
of the United Nations shall choose another of the means stipulated in Article
33 of the Charter of the United Nations, and so on until the controversy has
been resolved or until all the means of peaceful settlement there contemplated
have been exhausted.
Article V
(1) In order to facilitate the greatest possible measure of cooperation
and mutual understanding, nothing contained in this Agreement shall be
interpreted as a renunciation or diminution by the United Kingdom, British
Guiana or Venezuela of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in the
territories of Venezuela or British Guiana, or of any previously asserted
rights of or claims to such territorial sovereignty, or as prejudicing their
position as regards their recognition or non-recognition of a right of, claim
or basis of claim by any of them to such territorial sovereignty.
(2) No acts or activities taking place while this Agreement is in force
shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territo
rial sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela or British Guiana or create any
rights of sovereignty in those territories, except in so far as such acts or actiN« 8192
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vities result from any agreement reached by the Mixed Commission and
accepted in writing by the Government of Guyana and the Government of
Venezuela. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial
sovereignty in those territories shall be asserted while this Agreement is in
force, nor shall any claim whatsoever be asserted otherwise than in the Mixed
Commission while that Commission is in being.
Article VI

The Mixed Commission shall hold its first meeting at a date and place
to be agreed between the Governments of British Guiana and Venezuela.
This meeting shall take place as soon as possible after its members have been
appointed. Thereafter the Mixed Commission shall meet as and when agreed
between the representatives.
Article VII
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature.
Article VIII

Upon the attainment of independence by British Guiana, the Govern
ment of Guyana shall thereafter be a party to this Agreement, in addition to
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire
land and the Government of Venezuela.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by
their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE in duplicate at Geneva this 17th day of February, 1966, in the
English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authoritative.
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland :
Michael STEWART
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
L. F. S. BURNHAM
Prime Minister of British Guiana
For the Government of Venezuela :
Ignacio IRIBARREN BORGES
Minister for Foreign Affairs
N° 8192

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Peace Palace, Carnegieplein 2, 2517 KJ The Hague, Netherlands
Tel.: +31 (0)70 302 2323 Fax: +31 (0)70 364 9928
Website: www.icj-cij.org Twitter Account: @CIJ_ICJ YouTube Channel: CIJ ICJ

Press Release
Unofficial

No. 2018/17
4 April 2018

Guyana files an application against Venezuela
THE HAGUE, 4 April 2018. On Thursday 29 March 2018, the Co-operative Republic of
Guyana (hereinafter “Guyana”) filed an application against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
(hereinafter “Venezuela”) with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations.
In its Application, Guyana requests the Court “to confirm the legal validity and binding
effect of the Award Regarding the Boundary between the Colony of British Guiana and the
United States of Venezuela, of 3 October 1899 (hereinafter the ‘1899 Award’)”. The Applicant
claims that the 1899 Award was “a full, perfect, and final settlement” of all questions relating to
determining the boundary line between the colony of British Guiana and Venezuela.
Guyana affirms that, between November 1900 and June 1904, a joint Anglo-Venezuelan
Boundary Commission “identified, demarcated and permanently fixed the boundary established by
the . . . Award” before the signing of a Joint Declaration by the Commissioners on 10 January 1905
(referred to by Guyana as the “1905 Agreement”).
Guyana contends that, in 1962, for the first time, Venezuela contested the Award as
“arbitrary” and “null and void”. This, according to the Applicant, led to the signing of the
Agreement to resolve the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland over the frontier between Venezuela and British Guiana at Geneva on
17 February 1966 (hereinafter the “Geneva Agreement”), which “provided for recourse to a series
of dispute settlement mechanisms to finally resolve the controversy”.
Guyana submits that the Geneva Agreement authorized the United Nations
Secretary-General to decide which appropriate dispute resolution mechanism to adopt for the
peaceful settlement of the dispute, in accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.
The Applicant further argues that:
“On 30 January 2018, . . . Secretary-General [H.E.] António Guterres determined that the
Good Offices Process had failed to achieve a peaceful settlement of the controversy. He then took a
formal and binding decision, under Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Agreement, to choose a different
means of settlement under Article 33 of the Charter. In identical letters to both Parties, he
communicated the terms of his decision that, pursuant to the authority vested in him by the
Geneva Agreement, the controversy shall be settled by recourse to the International Court of
Justice.”

-2Guyana states that it “files [the] Application pursuant to the Secretary-General’s decision”.
In its Application, Guyana requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:
“(a) The 1899 Award is valid and binding upon Guyana and Venezuela, and the boundary
established by that Award and the 1905 Agreement is valid and binding upon Guyana and
Venezuela;
(b) Guyana enjoys full sovereignty over the territory between the Essequibo River and the
boundary established by the 1899 Award and the 1905 Agreement, and Venezuela enjoys
full sovereignty over the territory west of that boundary; Guyana and Venezuela are under an
obligation to fully respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in accordance
with the boundary established by the 1899 Award and the 1905 Agreement;
(c) Venezuela shall immediately withdraw from and cease its occupation of the eastern half of
the Island of Ankoko, and each and every other territory which is recognized as Guyana’s
sovereign territory in accordance with the 1899 Award and 1905 Agreement;
(d) Venezuela shall refrain from threatening or using force against any person and/or company
licensed by Guyana or engage in economic or commercial activity in Guyanese territory as
determined by the 1899 Award and 1905 Agreement, or in any maritime areas appurtenant to
such territory over which Guyana has sovereignty or exercises sovereign rights, and shall not
interfere with any Guyanese or Guyanese-authorised activities in those areas;
(e) Venezuela is internationally responsible for violations of Guyana’s sovereignty and
sovereign rights, and for all injuries suffered by Guyana as a consequence.”
___________
Note: The Court’s press releases are prepared by its Registry for information purposes only
and do not constitute official documents.
The full text of Guyana’s Application of 29 March 2018 will be available shortly on the
Court’s website.
___________
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.
It was established by the United Nations Charter in June 1945 and began its activities in
April 1946. The seat of the Court is at the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). Of the six
principal organs of the United Nations, it is the only one not located in New York. The Court has a
twofold role: first, to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by
States (its judgments have binding force and are without appeal for the parties concerned); and,
second, to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized
United Nations organs and agencies of the system. The Court is composed of 15 judges elected for
a nine-year term by the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations.
Independent of the United Nations Secretariat, it is assisted by a Registry, its own international
secretariat, whose activities are both judicial and diplomatic, as well as administrative. The official
languages of the Court are French and English. Also known as the “World Court”, it is the only
court of a universal character with general jurisdiction.

-3The ICJ, a court open only to States for contentious proceedings, and to certain organs and
institutions of the United Nations system for advisory proceedings, should not be confused with the
other  mostly criminal  judicial institutions based in The Hague and adjacent areas, such as the
International Criminal Court (ICC, the only permanent international criminal court, which was
established by treaty and does not belong to the United Nations system), the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (STL, an international judicial body with an independent legal personality, established by
the United Nations Security Council upon the request of the Lebanese Government and composed
of Lebanese and international judges), the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT,
mandated to take over residual functions from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), the Kosovo Specialist
Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (an ad hoc judicial institution which has its seat in
The Hague), or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA, an independent institution which assists
in the establishment of arbitral tribunals and facilitates their work, in accordance with the Hague
Convention of 1899).
___________
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